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Remedial Equilibration and the Right to




The modern "voting wars" involve repeated legal challenges alleging that
procedures aimed at protecting the electoral process, such as proof-of-
citizenship requirements for registration and voter identification laws,
violate the fundamental constitutional right to vote. In adjudicating such
cases, courts make effectively subjective judgments about whether the
challenged statutes or regulations make voting too burdensome.
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment offers critical, and previously
overlooked, insight into the scope of the right to vote. It imposes a
uniquely severe penalty-reduction in representation in the House of
Representatives and Electoral College-when that right is violated or
abridged. 'emedial deterrence," a crucial component of the broader
theory of remedial equilibration, teaches that courts take into account he
severity of the remedy for violating a legal provision when determining
that provision's scope. Stripping a state of its seats in Congress and votes
in the Electoral College is a uniquely severe penalty, effectively nullifying
the results of one or more elections, disenfranchising the people who voted
for the ejected representatives, diluting the vote of each member of the
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state's electorate, and potentially even changing control of Congress or the
outcome of a presidential election.
For such a dramatic penalty to be appropriate, a state's actions would
have to be especially egregious: direct disenfranchisement of certain
disfavored groups of people. Facially neutral registration or voting
procedures with which a person must comply in order to vote are
insufficient to meet this demanding standard. This remedial deterrence
interpretation of §2 is consistent with both the Fourteenth Amendment's
legislative history and Congress' contemporaneous interpretation of that
provision during its first attempt at enforcement. All of the state laws and
constitutional provisions that were identified in the 41st Congress as
violating §2 imposed additional qualifications for voting by
disenfranchising entire groups of people, such as the poor, the illiterate, or
racial minorities, due to their purportedly undesirable traits. A remedial
deterrence interpretation of §2 provides an objective and constitutionally-
based approach for determining whether various election laws violate the
Fourteenth Amendment right to vote.
INTRODUCTION
In nearly every federal election cycle since Bush v. Gore,'
plaintiffs have brought numerous lawsuits challenging the
validity of various statutes and regulations governing the
electoral process.2 Many of these lawsuits have alleged that
measures such as voter identification laws,3 deadlines for
registering to vote4 or requesting absentee ballots,5 reductions in
early voting periods,6 instant-runoff voting systems,' changes to
congressional district boundaries,8 and requirements for casting
1 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
2 RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS 4 (2012).
See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008); Frank v.
Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 844-63 (E.D. Wis. 2014), rev'd, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2014),
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1551 (2014); Veasey v. Perry, 71 F. Supp. 3d 627 (S.D. Tex. 2014),
aff'd in part, vacated in part, and remanded sub nom. Veasey v. Abbott, 796 F.3d 487
(5th Cir. 2015).
See, e.g., ACORN v. Bysiewicz, 413 F. Supp. 2d 119 (D. Conn. 2005) (challenging
law requiring people to register to vote at least seven days before an election); see also
Ohio State Conference of the NAACP v. Husted, 768 F.3d 524, 531, 545-49 (6th Cir.
2014) (challenging statute eliminating "Golden Week," during which people could both
register to vote and cast an early ballot on the same day).
s See, e.g., Fair Elections Ohio v. Husted, 770 F.3d 456 (6th Cir. 2014).
6 See, e.g., NAACP, 768 F.3d at 537-50; Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423,
428-36 (6th Cir. 2012).
See, e.g., Dudum v. Arntz, 640 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 2011).
" See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006).
280 [ 2015
279] REMEDIAL EQUILIBRATION 281
provisional ballots9 violate the right to vote as protected by the
Due Process Clause or Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.10 The plaintiffs in these cases
invariably seek injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent
election officials from applying or enforcing the allegedly
unconstitutional requirements or procedures in impending and
future elections."
Courts generally treat these lawsuits as they would any
other suits seeking prospective relief against impending
constitutional violations. Under Burdick v. Takushi,12 a court
begins by determining whether the challenged election law
imposes "severe restrictions" on the right to vote, in which case
the law is subject to strict scrutiny and generally invalidated.13
If the law does not impose such a burden-and most election
laws do not14-the court then balances the goals the law seeks to
further against the resulting burden on constitutional rights.15
9 See, e.g., N.E. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580, 591-99 (6th
Cir. 2012); Hunter v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 850 F. Supp. 2d 795, 834 (S.D.
Ohio 2012).
1o U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Other lawsuits have alleged that such restrictions
and requirements violate various provisions of state constitutions. I have demonstrated
elsewhere, however, that state constitutions generally do not provide "substantially
greater protection for the right to vote than the U.S. Constitution." Michael T. Morley,
Rethinking the Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 189,
191 (2014). The test that the Supreme Court has adopted for determining whether
election laws violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments, see infra notes 13-14 &
accompanying text, is similar to the standards state supreme courts have been applying
since the 1800s under their respective state constitutions. Morley, supra at 191-98.
" See, e.g., League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 248-
49 (4th Cir. 2014) (enjoining elimination of same-day voter egistration); NAACP, 768
F.3d at 532, 561 (affirming injunction prohibiting state from reducing early voting
hours); N.E. Ohio Coal., 696 F.3d at 604 (affirming preliminary injunction requiring
election officials to count certain incorrectly cast provisional ballots); Obama for Am.,
697 F.3d at 437 (affirming injunction requiring local boards of elections to permit all
voters to participate in early voting over the weekend before Election Day); Hunter, 850
F. Supp. 2d at 847 (enjoining board of elections from rejecting certain provisional ballots
that were cast in the wrong precincts); see generally Michael T. Morley, Public Law at
the Cathedral: Enjoining the Government, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 2453 (2014) (explaining
that injunctions are the most effective available mechanism for deterring constitutional
and statutory violations by government officials).
12 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
1s Id. at 434 (internal quotation marks omitted).
14 See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 & n. 9 (1983) (noting that the
Court typically upholds "reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions" and "generally
applicable and evenhanded restrictions that protect the integrity and reliability of the
electoral process itself').
1s Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434.
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It is somewhat remarkable that these claims are litigated
under § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment-whether the Due
Process Clause or Equal Protection Clause-because §2 is the
only portion of the Amendment that expressly mentions a right
to vote.16 Section 2 provides, in relevant part:
[W]hen the right to vote at any election for the choice of
electors for President and Vice-President of the United
States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and
Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the
Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male
inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age,
and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged,
except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the
basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the
proportion which the number of such male citizens shall
bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one
years of age in such State.17
Section 2 not only contains the Constitution's only express
recognition of a right to vote,18 but provides a remedy for
violations of that right. When a state "denie[s]" or "abridge[s]"
the right to vote of any inhabitants who meet § 2's age and
citizenship requirements (and are neither felons nor former
16 Cf. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (plurality opinion) ("Where a
particular Amendment 'provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection'
against a particular sort of government behavior, 'that Amendment, not the more
generalized notion of 'substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these
claims."') (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)); accord Cnty. of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998).
1 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (emphasis added).
1s The Constitution specifies that any person who is qualified to vote for "the most
numerous Branch of the State Legislature" must also be deemed qualified to vote in
elections for the House of Representatives and Senate. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; id. amend.
XVII, § 1. It also provides that people may not be deprived of the right to vote based on
certain specified grounds. See id. amend. XV (race); amend. XIX (gender); amend. XXIV
(failure to pay poll tax); amend. XXVI (age, for people who are at least 18 years old).
These clauses do not require a state, however, to permit any particular segment of its
citizenry to vote for either the state legislature, which would trigger eligibility to vote for
Congress, or for President. "[T]he Constitution of the United States does not confer the
right of suffrage upon any one." Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 178 (1874); see also
McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 39 (1892) ("The right to vote intended to be protected
refers to the right to vote as established by the laws and constitution of the State.");
United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 217 (1875) ("The Fifteenth Amendment does not
confer the right of suffrage upon any one.").
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Confederates),1 9 that state's "basis of representation" in the
House of Representatives-and therefore the Electoral College,
as we1120-must be proportionately reduced based on the
percentage of such inhabitants whose voting rights are abridged
or denied.21
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment is all but ignored in
contemporary constitutional discourse, doctrine, and litigation,22
and has never successfully been invoked as the basis for a cause
of action.23 This Article contends that § 2 provides a critical,
objective, and overlooked constitutional basis for determining
the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment right to vote, whether
that right is asserted directly under § 2 itself, or instead under
the Due Process Clause or Equal Protection Clause of § 1.
Part I introduces the concept of remedial equilibration, a
theory that contends that rights and remedies are integrally
related and intertwined. One component of remedial
equilibration, remedial deterrence, teaches that the scope of a
right can be determined, as both a descriptive and normative
matter, in part based on the severity of the remedy imposed for
violations. Courts presently determine whether election laws
violate the constitutional right to vote on a fairly subjective and
ad hoc basis, assessing whether they pose too much of an
inconvenience for too large a percentage of certain groups (such
as racial minorities or the poor). Remedial equilibration puts an
19 The Nineteenth Amendment likely renders §2's limitation to males
unenforceable, U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (prohibiting denial of the vote based on gender),
while the Twenty-Sixth Amendment probably modifies § 2's reference to twenty-one year-
olds, id. amend. XXVI (prohibiting denial of the vote based on age to anyone who is at
least 18 years old).
20 See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (specifying that a state must appoint a "Number of
[presidential] Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to
which such State may be entitled in the Congress").
21 Id. amend. XIV, § 2.
22 EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 529 (1978)
(labeling § 2 a "historical curiosity"); Michael Kent Curtis, The Fourteenth Amendment:
Recalling What the Court Forgot, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 911, 916 (2008) ("The Court,
Congress, and the nation have largely forgotten Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment."). Section 2's main role in constitutional doctrine to date has been to
provide textual reaffirmation that states may prohibit felons from voting. See Richardson
v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974); see also Richard M. Re & Christopher M. Re, Voting
and Vice: Criminal Disenfranchisement and the Reconstruction Amendments, 121 YALE
L.J. 1584, 1588 (2012) (discussing Richardson).
23 See Curtis, supra note 22, at 958-59; Gabriel J. Chin, Reconstruction, Felon
Disenfranchisement, and the Right to Vote: Did the Fifteenth Amendment Repeal
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment?, 92 GEO. L.J. 259, 260-61, 301 (2004); see, e.g.,
infra notes 327-59.
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important new spin on this analysis: a voting regulation or
procedure does not violate or abridge the right to vote protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment unless it is sufficiently severe to
warrant reducing a state's representation in the House and
Electoral College.24
Even if such reduction in representation is not the only
constitutionally permissible remedy for violations of the right to
vote,25 the fact that it is an authorized remedy-and the sole one
24 Franita Tolson is among the only scholars to have argued that § 2's penalty
provision should affect a court's interpretation of the right to vote, but she raised this
point to support her conclusion that courts should broadly construe Congress's authority
to enact legislation under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Franita Tolson, The
Constitutional Structure of Voting Rights Enforcement, 89 WASH. L. REV. 379, 384-85
(2014) ("[T]he extreme penalty in section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment ... influences
the scope of penalties that Congress can impose pursuant to its enforcement authority
under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.").
25 Based on the debates surrounding the drafting of § 2, a powerful argument could
be made that reduction in representation is the only constitutionally permissible remedy
for a denial of the right to vote, unless the denial is "on account of" a characteristic such
as race or gender that other amendments prohibit, see supra note 18.
Section 2 is comparable to the Takings Clause, which provides, "[N]or shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST.
amend. V, cl. 5. The Supreme Court has explained that "this provision does not prohibit
the taking of private property, but instead places a condition on the exercise of that
power .... [I]t is designed not to limit the governmental interference with property
rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper
interference amounting to a taking." First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cnty.
of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 314 (1987) (emphasis in original); accord Lingle v. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536-37 (2005). When the Government seizes or condemns
private property, the Takings Clause renders unavailable remedies other than
compensation, such as the return of the property. See First English, 482 U.S. at 314.
Similarly, § 2 could be read, consistent with its legislative history, as implicitly
barring courts from awarding remedies for violations of the right to vote other than a
reduction in the offending states' representation in Congress and the Electoral College,
such as an injunction against the unconstitutional statute or regulation. See Michael
Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213,
228-29 (1991) ("Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment plainly assumed the
lawfulness of racial discrimination in voting; it seems implausible that Section One, in
which the Equal Protection Clause resides, was intended to prohibit what its successor
section unambiguously tolerated."); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 594 (1964) (Harlan,
J., dissenting) (explaining that § 2 "expressly recognizes the States' power to deny or in
any way abridge the right of their inhabitants to vote for the members of the [State]
Legislature," subject o "its express provision of a remedy for such denial or abridgment"
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
Indeed, the whole reason Congress enacted the Fifteenth Amendment, prohibiting
states from denying the right to vote based on race, was because the Fourteenth
Amendment did not actually confer an individually enforceable right to vote. See Oregon
v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 154 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); see also Mark S. Scarberry, Historical Considerations and Congressional
Representation for the District of Columbia: Constitutionality of the D.C. House Voting
Rights Bill in Light of Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment and the History of the
Creation of the District, 60 ALA. L. REV. 783, 820 (2009) ("[N]either the Republican
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specified by the Fourteenth Amendment-still yields important
insight into the scope of the underlying right. An election
regulation warrants the extreme measure of stripping a state of
its representation in the House or the Electoral College-
thereby potentially changing control of Congress or even the
Presidency-only if it constitutes direct disenfranchisement of
certain disfavored groups of qualified voters. Viewed from this
remedial equilibration perspective, the type of paperwork
requirements, administrative inconveniences, and generally
applicable procedures that all people must follow in order to vote
that have been challenged in recent yearS26 neither would be,
nor should be, deemed violations of the right to vote.
Part II bolsters this remedial equilibration interpretation of
the right to vote by reviewing §2's legislative history,
demonstrating that its representation-stripping remedy was
viewed as integrally intertwined with the underlying right.
Reduction in representation was not enacted as simply one of
many potential remedies for violations of the right to vote, but
rather was seen as the exclusive remedy. Indeed, the Fourteenth
Amendment's framers expressly recognized that §2 allowed
states to decide for themselves whether to expand the franchise,
or instead suffer reduced representation.
Part III goes on to examine how the 41st Congress,
comprised largely of Representatives and Senators who had
debated and passed the Fourteenth Amendment, attempted to
enforce §2 through the Ninth Census. This enforcement effort
'moderates' nor the nation at-large seemed ready [at the time of the Fourteenth
Amendment's framing] to require the formerly rebellious states to grant equal
suffrage.").
Such an interpretation of § 2 is bolstered by the phrasing of other constitutional
provisions which expressly state that the remedies specified are not intended as an
exclusive list, see, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7 (limiting "Judgment in Cases of
Impeachment" to removal from office and disqualification from any other office, but
specifying that the impeached official "shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law"), or grant broad
authority to enforce specific compliance or determine the consequences for violations; see,
e.g., id. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 (providing that members of a House of Congress "may be
authorized to compel the Attendance of absent Members, in such Manner, and under
such Penalties as each House may provide"); id. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 ("Each House may ...
punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour."). I will address this stronger variation of
the argument in future work. Even if one disagrees that §2 sets forth the exclusive
means of enforcing the right to vote, however, the fact that the sole remedy specified in
the Constitution for violations of that right is a reduction in representation still yields
valuable insight into that right's intended nature and scope.
26 See supra notes 3-9 and accompanying text (discussing judicial challenges to
such measures).
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reveals that the Fourteenth Amendment's framers believed that
state laws which barred certain disfavored classes of people from
voting violated the right to vote, while other laws that imposed
administrative rules or established certain procedures for voting
did not. Part IV rounds out the discussion by exploring the
various ways in which the few courts and commentators to have
considered § 2 in any depth have approached the right to vote.
Part V briefly concludes.
This Article approaches constitutional interpretation from a
variety of perspectives. Most basically, § 2's text provides
important, and long overlooked, insight into the scope of the
right to vote. The legislative history surrounding § 2 also
provides an intriguing perspective on Congress's original intent
and understanding concerning the scope of that right. Even if
one adopts a purely modern perspective, however, the severity of
the remedy that §2 authorizes for violations of the right to vote
strongly counsels in favor of construing the scope of that right
narrowly, as protecting against actual disenfranchisement,
rather than election regulations or procedures with which a
person must comply when voting.
I. REMEDIAL EQUILIBRATION AND THE RIGHT TO VOTE
The scope of the Fourteenth Amendment right to vote may
best be understood by considering the amendment as a whole.
Section 1 does not expressly mention the right to vote.27 To the
extent § 1 protects voting rights, it is as a component of
substantive due process28 or a field that triggers heightened
protection for equal protection purposes.29 Section 2, in contrast,
27 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
28 League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Brunner, 548 F.3d 463, 478 (6th Cir. 2008)
("The Due Process Clause is implicated, and § 1983 relief is appropriate, in the
exceptional case where a state's voting system is fundamentally unfair."); Bennett v.
Yoshina, 140 F.3d 1218, 1226 (9th Cir. 1998) ("[A]n election is a denial of substantive
due process if it is conducted in a manner that is fundamentally unfair."); Griffin v.
Burns, 570 F.2d 1065, 1078 (1st Cir. 1978); see also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000)
("When the state legislature vests the right to vote for President in its people, the right
to vote as the legislature has prescribed is fundamental.").
29 Bush, 531 U.S. at 104-05 ("Having once granted the right to vote on equal terms,
the State may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person's vote
over that of another."); Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966)
("[O]nce the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be drawn which are
inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."); cf.
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568 ("[The Equal Protection Clause requires that the seats in both
houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis.").
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provides that, when a state "denie[s] ... or in any way
abridge[s]" the "right to vote" of male citizens who are at least
twenty-one years old at any election for specified federal and
state offices, the state's basis of representation in the House
(and thereby the Electoral College) "shall be" proportionally
reduced.0 This remedial provision offers important-and
typically overlooked-guidance about the scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment right to vote.
Section A introduces a form of "remedial equilibration"
called "remedial deterrence" to explain how the remedies for
violations of a legal provision help courts determine the
provision's meaning and scope. Section B examines § 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment from a remedial deterrence perspective,
arguing that reducing a state's representation in the House of
Representatives and Electoral College is an especially severe
sanction. The severity of that penalty counsels strongly in favor
of establishing a high threshold for what constitutes a violation
of the right to vote. In other words, a statute should not be
deemed to violate the right to vote unless it directly
disenfranchises people. Mere procedural or identification
requirements for voting should not be deemed to violate that
right. Finally, Section C concludes this analysis by contending
that the same remedial deterrence analysis applies to right-to-
vote claims brought under the Due Process Clause or Equal
Protection Clause of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A. Descriptive and Normative Perspectives on Remedial
Equilibration
The Fourteenth Amendment neither defines the contours of
the right to vote nor provides any express guidance as to what
constitutes a violation of that right. Daryl Levinson's theory of
remedial equilibration, however, suggests how §2's remedial
provision yields insight into those issues. Remedial equilibration
teaches that "rights and remedies are inextricably
intertwined."31 Rights depend on remedies "for their scope,
shape, and very existence."32 One type of remedial equilibration
30 U.S. CONST. amend. X1V, § 2 (emphasis added).
3' Daryl Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 857, 858 (1999).
32 Id.
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is remedial deterrence, which is the principle that a right "may
be shaped by the nature of the remedy that will follow if the
right is violated."33
Levinson presents remedial deterrence primarily as a
descriptive or positive theory of judicial behavior.34 "[E]nhancing
the remedy" for a constitutional violation, Levinson argues, will
lead courts to "pare back the constitutional right" to minimize
the need to grant stronger, potentially problematic relief.35 In
other words, "[t]he threat of undesirable remedial consequences
motivat[es] courts to construct the right in such a way as to
avoid those consequences."36 For example, the exclusionary rule
sometimes allows guilty and potentially violent criminals to
remain free and unpunished. Such undesirable consequences
may lead courts to construe criminal defendants' underlying
Fourth Amendment rights narrowly to avoid having to conclude
that a violation occurred and award such relief.37
Conversely, when remedies become less severe or less
available, courts may be more willing to recognize rights or
construe them expansively.38 John Jeffries argues that the
qualified immunity doctrine, which makes it harder for courts to
award damages against government officials who violate
constitutional rights, may make courts more willing to conclude
that constitutional violations have occurred.39 Several other
3 Id. at 884.
3 See id. at 873, 884.
as Levinson, supra note 31, at 889.
,6 Id. at 885.
3 William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV.
881 (1991); cf. Sonja B. Starr, Rethinking "Effective Remedies": Remedial Deterrence in
International Courts, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 694, 742 (2008) (arguing that, because
international appellate tribunals are generally limited to either freeing brutal war
criminals or ordering new multi-year trials for them, such tribunals are reluctant to
conclude that errors occurred in defendants' trials).
3 Andrew Gilden, Copyright Essentialism and the Performativity of Remedies, 54
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1123, 1130 (2013) (arguing that limits on the availability of
injunctive relief against copyright infringement make courts more willing to conclude
that infringement has occurred); Elizabeth Canter, Note, A Fourth Amendment
Metamorphosis: How Fourth Amendment Remedies and Regulations Facilitated the
Expansion of the Threshold Injury, 95 VA. L. REV. 155, 156 (2009) ("As the chief remedy
for Fourth Amendment violations-the exclusionary rule-has become a shadow of its
former self, the Fourth Amendment right has been able to evolve in a more expansive
direction.").
39 John C. Jeffries, Jr., Reversing the Order of Battle in Constitutional Torts, 2009
SUP. CT. REV. 115, 122; John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional
Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 90, 98 (1999). Sam Kamin responds that limits on remedies can
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scholars, making a similar point, have contended that the scope
of a right often depends upon the judicial context-i.e., civil or
criminal case-in which the right is asserted.40
Remedial deterrence also may be viewed as a normative
prescription, although Levinson does not present the concept in
this manner. All else being equal, one reasonably might expect
that, if a legal provision carries especially harsh consequences
for violations, it would (and should) take a serious act to violate
it. "[I]t is a precept of justice that punishment ... should be
graduated and proportioned to offense."41 When a provision
bearing a severe remedy is reasonably susceptible to multiple
constructions, one generally should favor a construction that
would require a correspondingly serious act to trigger
those consequences.
For example, if a statute prohibited "wrongdoing," but
carried a death sentence, then the magnitude of that remedy
(even absent constitutional avoidance canons or the rule of
lenity) would strongly suggest that the law pertained only to
extremely serious acts, such as murder.42 Conversely, if the
maximum penalty for violations were either a small fine or
confinement for a few days, one reasonably might conclude that
the provision applied to fairly trivial acts, such as jaywalking.
Indeed, federal law declares that an offense for which the
maximum term of imprisonment is "five days or less" is only an
lead courts to refuse to consider whether constitutional violations have occurred. Sam
Kamin, Harmless Error and the Rights/Remedies Split, 88 VA. L. REV. 1, 38 (2002). For
example, government officials cannot be held liable for a constitutional violation unless
the right was "clearly established" at the time of the alleged violation. This limitation on
liability may make courts more willing to conclude that the officials' conduct was
unconstitutional. Because courts can dispose of such cases on the grounds that the
underlying right was not "clearly established," however, they instead can simply decline
to consider the threshold question of whether the Constitution was violated. Id. at 38, 72;
cf. David B. Owen, Comment, Fourth Amendment Remedial Equilibration: A Comment
on Herring v. United States and Pearson v. Callahan, 62 STAN. L. REV. 563, 580, 585
(2010) (contending that limitations on remedies undermine rights by encouraging
government officials to do the bare minimum to avoid imposition of an adverse remedy,
rather than aiming to uphold the right itself).
40 Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 92 B.U. L. REV. 405, 407 (2012); Jennifer E.
Laurin, Rights Translation and Remedial Disequilibration in Constitutional Criminal
Procedure, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1002, 1006-07 (2010) ("The contours of rights are shaped
by doctrinal, institutional, and administrative concerns that are unique to the
adjudicatory arena in which they are litigated . . . .").
41 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910); see also Graham v. Florida,
560 U.S. 48, 59 (2010).
42 Such a statute, of course, likely would be unconstitutionally vague. United States
v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008).
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"infraction";43 an offense for which the maximum term is
between six days and one year is a "misdemeanor."44 These
classifications reaffirm that statutes which carry limited
remedies are generally understood as relating to minor
misconduct, and therefore should not be interpreted to embrace
serious or reprehensible acts (and certainly should not be read
as pertaining exclusively to such acts).
Similarly, the Supreme Court has held that, when the
penalty for violating a statute is "relatively small," and the
statute itself does not discuss mens rea, courts may "dispens[e]
with" an intent requirement and "hold[ ] that the guilty act
alone makes out he crime" or civil violation.45 From a pragmatic
perspective, as the remedy for a statutory violation grows more
lax, the harm that would result from an erroneous ruling
correspondingly diminishes. Courts see less need to recognize
implied statutory elements to ensure accurate adjudications,
and such additional protections may be inefficient.
The absence of substantial remedies can affect not only a
court's interpretation of a legal provision, but the procedure the
court must employ in determining whether it has been violated.
A civil jury is not required in federal courts if the amount in
controversy is less than $20,46 and federal courts generally are
unavailable to resolve disputes between citizens of different
states (at least in the absence of a federal question) if the
amount in controversy is only $75,000 or less.4 7 In criminal
cases, a defendant does not have the right to counsel unless
imprisonment is a possible penalty for an offense,48 and does not
have the right to a jury unless he faces imprisonment of six
months or more.49 Again, the absence of such procedural
4 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(9).
4 Id. § 3559(a)(6)-(8).
4 Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 255 n.13, 256 (1952); cf. United States
v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 442 n.18 (1978) ("The severity of these sanctions
provides further support for our conclusion that the Sherman Act should not be
construed as creating strict-liability crimes.").
46 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
4 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
4 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). Compare FED. R. CRIM. PROC.
5(d)(1)(B) (requiring courts in felony cases to inform defendants that they are entitled to
retain counsel "or to request that counsel be appointed if the defendant cannot obtain
counsel") with id. R. 58(b)(2)(B)-(C) (same provision, with the proviso that a defendant
may not request the appointment of counsel if he is charged with "a petty offense").
' Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970).
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safeguards reflects the general, and reasonable, assumption that
the gravity of an alleged violation can largely be inferred from
the magnitude of the attendant penalty.
B. Remedial Equilibration and Voting Litigation Under § 2 of
the Fourteenth Amendment
Section 2's remedial provisions provide important insight
into the scope of the constitutional right to vote. It is helpful to
begin by clearing away some of the provision's anachronistic
underbrush. Section 2 refers to the right to vote of people who
meet four qualifications: (i) males, (ii) who are at least twenty-
one years old, (iii) are citizens of the United States, and (iv) have
not been disenfranchised "for participation in rebellion, or other
crime."50 The first two limitations have been superseded by
subsequent amendments, which prohibit the federal government
or any state from "den[ying]" or "abridg[ing]" the "right of
citizens of the United States to vote" on "account of sex"51 or, for
persons "who are eighteen years of age or older," on "account of
age."5 2 Thus, as modified by subsequent amendments, § 2
pertains to the right to vote of U.S. citizens (regardless of
gender) who are at least 18 years old,53 and have not been
disenfranchised for committing a crime or participating
in rebellion.54
Section 2 differs substantially from subsequent
amendments relating to the right to vote. The Fifteenth,
Nineteenth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments all share common
language, providing that "[t]he right of citizens of the United
States" to "vote shall not be denied or abridged" on certain
specified grounds (race, gender, and age, respectively).5 5 None of
these provisions actually creates a right to vote for any office, or
so U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §2.
51 Id. amend. XIX, § 1.
52 Id. amend. XXVI, § 1.
3 See Curtis, supra note 22, at 958.
5' Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974) (affirming the constitutionality of
felon disenfranchisement, based primarily on § 2); see Re & Re, supra note 22, at 1660-61
(explaining that § 2's reference to "other crime" was intended to apply only to serious
crimes). But see Chin, supra note 23, at 277 (contending that felon disenfranchisement is
unconstitutional because the Fifteenth Amendment implicitly repealed § 2). For brevity,
this Article's discussion of the right to vote under § 2 will not reiterate this limitation
concerning felons and insurrectionists.
rs U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1; id. amend. XIX, § 1; id. amend. XXVI, § 1.
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confers such a right on any person. Rather, each of these
amendments simply protects otherwise qualified people from
being deprived, based on the specified characteristic, of any
right to vote to which they otherwise might be entitled. The
mandatory language of these provisions strongly suggests that
the rights they create are protected by property rules.56 In other
words, they are enforceable through injunctions compelling the
governmental entity at issue to cease the prohibited
discrimination and allow the victims of any such discrimination
to vote.
Section 2, in contrast, does not employ such mandatory or
prohibitory language concerning the right to vote. Moreover,
unlike those other provisions-indeed, unlike virtually any other
constitutional clause57-§ 2 contains its own explicit remedial
provision. Read at face value, § 2 (as modified by the Nineteenth
and Twenty-Sixth amendments58) provides only that, "when" a
state denies or abridges "the right to vote" of citizens who are at
least eighteen years old, its basis of representation in the
House, and therefore Electoral College, shall be
reduced proportionately.
Under a strict plain-meaning interpretation, §2 neither
affirmatively guarantees a right to vote nor requires states to
refrain from violating any such right.59 Instead, § 2 puts states
"to a choice[:] enfranchise . .. voters or lose congressional
representation."6 0 A citizen who is eighteen or older yet
prohibited from voting would not be able to sue for injunctive
relief to compel the state to allow him to vote but, at most, would
only be able to seek to have the state's congressional delegation
reduced as a penalty. It is highly unlikely, however, that a
6 See Morley, supra note 11, at 2475-76 (explaining that the text of most
constitutional provisions strongly suggests they are enforceable through injunctions).
5 Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[Nior shall private property be taken for public use
without just compensation.").
58 See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
59 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (Dec. 18, 1865) (statement of Rep.
Stevens); Re & Re, supra note 22, at 1605; Curtis, supra note 22, at 957-58; Chin, supra
note 23, at 266-67; Eugene Sidney Bayer, The Apportionment Section of the Fourteenth
Amendment: A Neglected Weapon for Defense of the Voting Rights of Southern Negroes,
16 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 965, 973 (1965); see also supra note 25.
6 Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 73-74 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 594 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (explaining that § 2
"expressly recognizes the States' power to deny 'or in any way' abridge the right of their
inhabitants to vote for 'the members of the [State] Legislature').
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person improperly prohibited from voting would have standing
to seek such a reduction in representation in court.61 "Relief that
does not remedy the injury suffered cannot bootstrap a plaintiff
into federal court; that is the very essence of the redressability
requirement."62 Reduction in a state's representation would do
nothing to redress the injury caused by denying a qualified
elector the right to vote. At most, reduction in representation
would be a punishment aimed at compelling the state to restore
the plaintiffs voting rights. Because there is no guarantee that
either the threat or imposition of a reduction in representation
would compel the state to acquiesce and permit the plaintiff to
vote, the plaintiff would lack standing to seek such relief.6 3
Such reasoning is a straightforward application of the
Supreme Court's ruling in Linda R.S. v. Richard D.,6 4 that a
person generally lacks any judicially enforceable interest in the
enforcement of criminal laws.6 5 In Linda R.S., state law made it
a misdemeanor for a person to willfully fail to pay child
support.66 State courts had held that the law applied solely to
legitimate children, and not illegitimate children.67 The plaintiff
was an unwed mother who was not receiving support payments
from the father of her child. She sued, alleging that the district
attorney for her area was violating the Equal Protection Clause
by refusing to enforce the law against fathers who did not
support their children born outside of marriage.68 She sought an
injunction forbidding the district attorney "from declining
6 The judiciary's likely desire to avoid determining whether a state's basis for
representation in Congress should be reduced itself decreases the likelihood that a court
would find that any plaintiff had standing to bring the claim. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies-and Their Connections to Substantive
Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633, 636 (2006) ("[Cloncerns about remedies exert a nearly
ubiquitous, often unrecognized, and little understood influence in the shaping and
application of justiciability doctrines."); see, e.g., Mark R. Killenbeck & Steve Sheppard,
Another Such Victory? Term Limits, Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the
Right to Representation, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1121, 1186 (1994) (arguing that the "tortured
logic" of Saunders v. Wilkins, 152 F.2d 235, 237-38 (4th Cir. 1945), "reveal[s] a court
struggling to avoid the [§ 2] issue, rather than one trying to determine whether the
Constitution had been violated").
62 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 107 (1998).
6 Lampkin v. Connor, 239 F. Supp. 757, 759-60 (D.D.C. 1965) ("Lampkin 1"), aff'd
on other grounds, 360 F.2d 505 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ("Lampkin IF).
6 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
65 See id. at 619.
66 Id. at 615 (citing TEX. PEN. CODE art. 602).
67 Id.
6 Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 615-16.
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prosecution on the ground that the unsupported child
is illegitimate."69
The Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff lacked
standing to maintain her claim. Although she had been injured
for Article III purposes "from the failure of her child's father to
contribute support payments," the Court held that the injury did
not stem from the district attorney's selective enforcement of the
child support law.7 0 The Court explained that, if the plaintiff
"were granted the requested relief, it would result only in the
jailing of the child's father. The prospect that prosecution will,
at least in the future, result in payment of support can, at best,
be termed only speculative."n It concluded by reaffirming that
"a citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution
or nonprosecution of another," even if the citizen has been
victimized by that other person's crimes.7 2 Likewise, a person
who is denied the right to vote would lack a judicially cognizable
interest in having her state's congressional delegation reduced
in size; such a reduction would neither restore her right nor
compensate her in any meaningful way for its loss. 7 3
69 Id. at 616.
7o Id. at 617-18.
71 Id. at 618.
72 Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 619.
7 Other types of lawsuits seeking to reduce a state's representation in Congress
would be even more likely to fail on standing grounds. If a state violates § 2, citizens or
Members of Congress from other states could plausibly contend that they have an
interest in having that state's congressional delegation reduced in size. The fewer
representatives the offending state sends to Congress, the marginally more power
Members and, indirectly, voters of other states, would thereby wield. It is slightly easier
to pass legislation-and each Member's vote is correspondingly worth more-if the
House of Representatives has only 433 seated Members, as opposed to its full
complement of 435.
Even though reducing the basis of representation of states that violate § 2 would
benefit Representatives and voters from other states, they would lack standing to seek
such relief, because it is not their right to vote that is being violated. Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (holding that a litigant "generally must assert his own legal
rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of
third parties"). Moreover, the few courts that have considered such claims have held
that, to establish standing, a plaintiff must show that the size of her state's
congressional delegation would increase. Merely eliminating representatives from other
states is insufficient to give a plaintiff a concrete and particularized interest in pursuing
a §2 claim. Sharrow v. Brown, 447 F.2d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 1971) (dismissing §2 suit for lack
of standing because, "even after approximate nation-wide reapportionment figures were
derived, it might well be that, because of population shifts, or because New York itself
disenfranchised a portion of its adult males, New York's representation would not be
increased as [plaintiff| claims"); Lampkin 1, 239 F. Supp. 757, 760 (D.D.C. 1965)
(dismissing a § 2 suit for lack of standing because "it would be sheer speculation that
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Putting aside standing considerations, if a court were to
entertain a §2 lawsuit seeking a reduction in representation,7 4
the nature of the proceedings and the relief sought would
unavoidably influence its determination concerning the scope of
the right to vote. Scholars repeatedly have recognized that the
manner in which a court interprets constitutional provisions
often depends on whether the constitutional issue is raised in a
civil proceeding or criminal prosecution.75 A lawsuit seeking to
reduce a state's representation in Congress, while nominally
civil, is sui generis and would exert its own unique pressures
and pathologies that would inexorably influence the court's
merits determination. And, even if the nature of the proceedings
itself does not influence the court's construction of the right to
vote, the Court both should,7 6 and likely would,77 take into
account the magnitude, gravity, and intrinsically political
nature of the remedy sought in determining whether the right to
vote was violated.
Eliminating one or more seats from a state's congressional
delegation would be a remedy of extraordinary magnitude. Such
a ruling would effectively nullify the outcomes of one or more
elections, at least partially disenfranchising the tens or
hundreds of thousands of people who voted in those elections. It
also would likely trigger redistricting of the entire state,
consolidating larger numbers of voters into fewer districts,
thereby further diluting each person's voting power. 78The ruling
also could cut short the careers of influential federal politicians
within the state whose seats are eliminated as a result of the
reduction in representation. Control of the House of
Representatives could shift based on the elimination of even a
single Member. Even the outcome of a Presidential election
such data would result in the acquisition of one or more House seats by . .. the States in
which [the] plaintiffs reside"); see also Sharrow v. Fish, 501 F. Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y.
1980), aff'd, 659 F.2d 1062 (2d Cir. 1981); Sharrow v. Peyser, 443 F. Supp. 321, 325
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 582 F.2d 1271 (2d Cir. 1978).
7 See Curtis, supra note 22, at 1007 (arguing that, if Congress will not enforce § 2,
then courts should do so); Bayer, supra note 59, at 989-93 (discussing structure of
possible § 2 action); Arthur Earl Bonfield, The Right to Vote and Judicial Enforcement of
Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 108, 129-36 (1960) (same).
7 See supra note 40.
6 See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying notes.
1 See supra notes 33, 35-39 and accompanying notes.
7 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962) (recognizing vote dilution as a
constitutional injury).
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could be altered, since the number of electoral votes a state
receives depends on the size of the congressional delegation to
which it is "entitled."79 There is a substantial risk that any such
relief would be seen as unavoidably political, thereby potentially
jeopardizing the judiciary's institutional legitimacy.80 Thus, if a
plaintiff filed a §2 lawsuit seeking the relief set forth in that
provision, the court would, quite reasonably, be influenced by
such considerations in determining whether the plaintiffs right
to vote was violated.
Section 2's remedial provision remains relevant in
determining the scope of the right to vote, even if reduction in
representation is not the sole or required remedy for violations
of that right. When a plaintiff seeks only an injunction
invalidating a state election law or regulation, or an order
directing that his vote be counted, a remedial deterrence
approach still can help the court determine whether her rights
have been violated. Reduction in representation is a
constitutionally authorized, and perhaps even preferred, remedy
for violations of the right to vote. It is the only remedy expressly
mentioned in the document's text81 or discussed in the debates
over the Fourteenth Amendment's framing.82 In construing the
right to vote under the Fourteenth Amendment, a court should
consider the only express guidance the Constitution gives as to
the scope of that right.
Moreover, § 2 does not distinguish between "serious" and
"minor" violations of the right to vote, assuming that such
concepts meaningfully exist. To the contrary, it expressly
7 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
8 Cf. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 112-13, 132 (1962) (contending that the Supreme Court
should avoid politically charged issues that will bring it into conflict with other
branches). Compare Margaret Jane Radin, Can the Rule of Law Survive Bush v. Gore?,
in BUSH V. GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY 110, 114 (Bruce Ackerman ed., 2002)
(arguing that Bush v. Gore will "embarrass the Court for the rest of its history"), with
Jeffrey L. Yates & Andrew B. Whitford, The Presidency and the Supreme Court After
Bush v. Gore: Implications for Institutional Legitimacy and Effectiveness, 13 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 101, 117 (2002) ("[Tjhe Supreme Court's long-term legitimacy and
effectiveness have not been irreparably damaged [by Bush v. Gore].").
8' Indeed, at least as a matter of plain meaning, original intent, and original
understanding, see infra Parts II-III, it reasonably could be argued that reduction in
representation is the sole constitutionally authorized remedy for a violation of the right
to vote. Whatever the merits of such an argument, it runs contrary to well established
precedents enforcing voting rights through injunctive relief under both the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses. See supra notes 28-28.
82 See infra Part II.
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contemplates reduction in representation as the remedy for both
widespread and limited violations of the right; the more people a
state disenfranchises, the more seats in the House and Electoral
College it should lose. Thus, there is no basis for arguing that § 2
provides guidance only for the most egregious cases, while
courts remain free to adopt broader conceptions of the right to
vote when plaintiffs seek less extreme forms of relief.
The severity of the remedy set forth in § 2 strongly implies
that the right to vote protects individuals against acts that are
sufficiently serious to warrant the extreme relief of reduction in
representation: actual, literal disenfranchisement. The
enactment of mere procedural or administrative requirements
that a person must satisfy in order to be permitted to vote are
unlikely to warrant such relief, and therefore should not be
deemed to violate the Fourteenth Amendment right to vote.
C. Remedial Equilibration and Voting Litigation Under §1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment
One may contend that the scope of the "right to vote" in § 2
of the Fourteenth Amendment and the remedy set forth for
violations of that right tell us little about the "right to vote" as
protected by the Due Process Clause or Equal Protection Clause
of § 1.83 The Supreme Court generally recognizes, however, that
where a constitutional provision expressly and specifically
addresses a particular right, that provision, rather than more
general provisions, determines the scope of the right.84 For
example, claims relating to unreasonable searches should be
litigated under the Fourth Amendment rather than
independently under the Due Process Clause.85 Similarly, claims
relating to states' restrictions on the right to vote should be
83 See supra notes 27-28.
* Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994); see, e.g., Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct.
2507, 2522 (2011) ("The fact that one constitutional provision expressly provides a right
to appointed counsel in specific circumstances indicates that the Constitution does not
also sub silentio provide that right far more broadly in another, more general,
provision."); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986) (holding that, with regard to
prison inmates, "the Due Process Clause affords ... no greater protection than does the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause").
* See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989); accord Conn v. Gabbert, 526
U.S. 286, 293 (1999). Of course, for Fourth Amendment claims against state and local
officials, the Fourth Amendment is incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961), but it is the Fourth
Amendment's substantive provisions that govern.
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litigated under § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than
the much vaguer provisions of § 1. Section 1's general language
should not be read as implicitly creating a broader right to vote
than the finely tuned provisions in § 2 that specifically and
directly address the issue.86
The Supreme Court has held that § 1 creates a right to
vote.87 Even if one believes, consistent with precedent, that
voting rights claims are cognizable under the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of § 1, Justice Harlan's eloquent
dissent in Reynolds v. Sims" holds true:
The [Fourteenth] Amendment is a single text. It was
introduced and discussed as such in the Reconstruction
Committee, which reported it to the Congress. It was
discussed as a unit in Congress and proposed as a unit to
the States, which ratified it as a unit. A proposal to split
up the Amendment and submit each section to the States
as a separate amendment was rejected by the
Senate . . . . The comprehensive scope of the second
section and its particular reference to the state
legislatures preclude the suggestion that the first section
was intended to have [a different] result.89
Reading the Fourteenth Amendment as a whole, the fact
that reduction in representation was authorized as a remedy for
violations or abridgements of the right to vote should guide
courts in determining the contours and scope of that right,
regardless of the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment under
which it is invoked.90
II. CRAFTING SECTION 2 OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
The legislative history of § 2 confirms that remedial
equilibration is the proper lens through which to view the right
to vote.9 1 Section 2's history can most easily be considered in
86 Cf. Morales v. TWA, 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992) ("[It is a commonplace of statutory
construction that the specific governs the general . . .
87 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554 (1964).
" 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
8 Id. at 594 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
9o Cf. Karman, supra note 25, at 228-29.
e1 Other scholars have parsed § 2's legislative history in the course of different
inquiries. See, e.g., Tolson, supra note 24, at 405-21 (arguing that § 2's legislative history
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three main stages: the original proposal of the Joint Committee
on Reconstruction, the Committee's revised proposal, and finally
the replacement proposals that ultimately were enacted as the
Fourteenth Amendment.
A. Original Proposal of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment arose from three
main concerns of congressional Republicans: the need to protect
freedmen in the South against violence, the desire to secure
their basic civil rights, and fears that representatives from the
former Confederacy would return to Congress and stymy or
undo post-war reforms. President Andrew Johnson and
congressional Democrats, in contrast, wished to normalize
relations with southern states as quickly as possible, caring
little about protecting blacks or integrating them into American
society or government. Indeed, several Democrats openly
espoused theories of white supremacy on the floor of Congress.92
The fight over southern representation in Congress erupted
at the outset of the 39th Congress. The Clerk of the House of
Representatives had been appointed at the behest of radical
Republican Representative Thaddeus Stevens.93 At Stevens'
shows that it was intended to increase Congress' power to protect voting rights); Re &
Re, supra note 22, at 1604-17 (arguing that § 2's legislative history confirms that
Congress' decision to refrain from guaranteeing voting rights for felons was deliberate
and reasoned); Scarberry, supra note 25, at 800-02 (arguing that § 2's legislative history
confirms that the District of Columbia is not entitled to representation in the U.S. House
of Representatives because seats may be apportioned only to states); Killenbeck &
Sheppard, supra note 61, at 1176-83, 1207-14 (explaining how § 2 permits states to
establish term limits for Congress); William W. Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth
Amendment, The "Right" to Vote, and the Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth Congress,
1965 SUP. CT. REV. 33, 45-46 (contending that § 2, as originally understood, did not
permit states to deny populations specified therein the right to vote); Chin, supra note
23, at 265 (arguing that § 2's legislative history confirms that it was repealed by the
Fifteenth Amendment). For more general histories, see George David Zuckerman, A
Consideration of the History and Present Status of Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 30 FORDHAM L. REV. 93 (1961); Earl M. Maltz, Moving Beyond Race: The
Joint Committee on Reconstruction and the Drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 287 (2015); Bayer, supra note 59, at 968-72.
92 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 214-22 (Jan. 12, 1866) (statement of
Rep. Davis); id. at 353 (Jan. 22, 1866) (statement of Rep. Rogers) (arguing that blacks
are "men of an inferior race" and "by the laws of God are stamped with an inferiority so
indeliable that nothing can wipe it out"); id. at 380 (Jan. 23, 1866) (statement of Rep.
Brooks) ("I am in favor of my own color in preference to any other color, and I prefer the
white women of my country to the negro."); id. at 448-49 (Jan. 26, 1866) (statement of
Rep. Harding) (insisting that the United States is a "white man's Government").
9 Benjamin B. Kendrick, The History of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, in
JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION 131, 142 (Benjamin
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direction, the Clerk excluded Representatives who had been
elected from Tennessee, a former Confederate state, from the
official roll of the House and refused to allow debate or a vote on
the issue.94 These maneuvers precluded the Tennessee
Representatives from assuming office.
Seeking to further derail Johnson's plan for reconstructing
the South, Stevens proposed a resolution to form a Joint
Committee on Reconstruction in early December 1865. The
Committee, to be comprised of nine Representatives and six
Senators, would "inquire into the condition" of the former
Confederate states and report on whether they were "entitled to
be represented in either House of Congress."95 Congress passed
the resolution in less than two weeks.96 Moderate Republican
Senator William P. Fessenden was the Committee's chair,97 and
Stevens was one of its members.98
The Committee convened on January 6, 1866, and
immediately requested that the President "defer all further
executive action in regard to reconstruction" until the
B. Kendrick, ed. 1914) (hereafter, Joint Committee History).
9 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (Dec. 4, 1865).
9s Id. at 6 (Dec. 4, 1865).
96 The House passed the resolution immediately, id. at 6 (Dec. 4, 1865), and the
Senate passed it with minor amendments, id. at 30 (Dec. 12, 1865), which the House
accepted, id. at 47 (Dec. 13, 1865). As originally proposed, Stevens' resolution would have
prohibited either House of Congress from accepting any representatives from former
Confederate states until the Committee issued a report and Congress acted on it. Id. at 6
(Dec. 4, 1865). The Senate struck that language, id. at 24 (Dec. 12, 1865) (proposing
amendment); id. at 28 (Dec. 12, 1865) (adopting amendment), on the grounds that each
chamber has indefeasible constitutional authority to decide for itself the elections,
qualifications, and returns of its own members, id. at 24-25 (Dec. 12, 1865) (statements
of Sen. Anthony and Sen. Doolittle). Some Senators went even further, arguing that
members of the House should not have any input into whether putative Senators from
southern states should be seated. See id. at 28 (Dec. 12, 1865) (statements of Sen.
Saulsbury and Sen. Hendricks). But as Senator Lyman Trumbell cogently explained, "It
would produce a very awkward and undesirable state of things .. . if the House of
Representatives were to admit members from one of the lately rebellious States and the
Senate were to refuse to receive Senators from the same State." Id. at 29 (Dec. 12, 1865)
(statement of Sen. Trumbell).
The following month, after the Joint Committee had been formed and debate on
its initial proposal dragged on, Congress revisited the issue of admitting Representatives
and Senators from southern states. It adopted a joint resolution stating, "[N]o Senator or
Representative shall be admitted into either branch of Congress from any of said [former
Confederate] States until Congress shall have declared such State entitled to such
representation." Id. at 950 (Feb. 20, 1866) (House passage); Id. at 966 (Feb. 21, 1866)
(House on reconsideration); id. at 984 (Feb. 23, 1866) (initial Senate consideration); id. at
1147 (Mar. 2, 1866) (Senate enactment).
97 Id. at 106 (Dec. 21, 1865).
9 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (Dec. 14, 1865).
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Committee finished its deliberations.99 Expressing his desire "to
secure harmony of action between Congress and the Executive,"
Johnson responded that he did not intend to take any further
steps at that time.10 0
As a starting point for its deliberations, the Committee
agreed on January 12 that "the apportionment of representation
in Congress, as now provided by the Constitution, ought to be
changed."10 1 Several Committee members suggested competing
procedures for allotting representatives among states:
* Rep. Stevens proposed that representation be
based on the number of legal voters in each state
who were citizens and at least twenty-one years
old.102 The Committee amended his proposal so
that only male voters who were citizens of the
requisite age would be counted,103 but declined to
further limit the basis of representation to those
who were literate.104 This proposal would have
disadvantaged states with large populations of
women and aliens, as well as states with voting
qualifications such as property requirements.
* Rep. Justin Morrill proposed that representation
be based on each state's population, but if a state
denied any person either civil or political rights,
all members of that person's race would be
completely excluded from the population count.05
This proposal would have had even more far-
reaching effects than the version of § 2 that
ultimately was enacted. If even a single black
person were denied his civil rights or the right to
vote, that state's entire population of blacks
9 Benjamin B. Kendrick, Journal of the Joint Committee of Fifteen on
Reconstruction, in JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION
37, 39 (Benjamin B. Kendrick, ed. 1914) (hereafter, Journal).
100 Id. at 41.
101 Id. at 44-45.
102 Id. at 41.
103 Journal, supra note 99, at 41.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 43.
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would have been excluded from its basis
of representation.
* Sen. George Henry Williams similarly proposed
that representation be based on each state's
population, but if a state constitution barred
members of a particular race from voting, all
members of that race would be completely
excluded from the population count.106 This
proposal was narrower than Morrill's because it
did not protect civil rights, and the penalty
mechanism was triggered only by voting
restrictions contained in state constitutions.
* Rep. Roscoe Conkling proposed that
representation be based on the number of U.S.
citizens in each state, but if a state denied any
person either civil or political rights "on account of
race or color," all members of that person's race
would be completely excluded from the population
count.07 This proposal also was a variation on
Morrill's; it allocated representatives, in the first
instance, based on the number of citizens in each
state, however, rather than the state's
overall population. 108
* Rep. George S. Boutwell proposed that
representation be based on the number of citizens
in each state. Instead of making adjustments or
exclusions to that figure, however, his proposal
ended by declaring, "and no State shall make any
distinction in the exercise of the elective franchise
on account of race or color."109 This was the only
proposal among the original submissions that
affirmatively barred racial discrimination
in voting.
106 Id.
107 Journal, supra note 99, at 44.




The Committee formed a five-member subcommittee,
including Fessenden and Stevens, to consider these various
apportionment schemes.110 On January 20, the subcommittee
reported two alternate constitutional amendments. Article A
reflects a combination of Conkling's and Boutwell's proposals;
Article B can be traced to Conkling's and Williams' proposals:
Article A.
Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned
among the several States within this Union, according to
the respective numbers of citizens of the United States in
each State; and all provisions in the Constitution or laws
of any State, whereby any distinction is made in political
or civil rights or privileges, on account of race, creed or
color, shall be inoperative or void."'
and
Article B.
Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned
among the several States which may be included within
this Union, according to their respective numbers,
counting the whole number of citizens of the United
States in each State; provided that, whenever the elective
franchise shall be denied or abridged in any State on
account of race, creed or color, all persons of such race,
creed or color, shall be excluded from the basis of
representation. 112
These proposals reflect two very different approaches to the
problem of black disenfranchisement. Article A would have
affirmatively prohibited states from depriving people of civil and
political rights based on race, color, or creed. Article B, in
contrast, was far narrower, limited solely to the right to vote; it
offered no protection for civil rights. Moreover, it did not even
n0 Id. at 45-46. The Committee also formed other subcommittees that were each
charged with investigating certain former Confederate states to determine whether they
were now loyal and assess the "present legal position" of their freedman. Id. at 47-48.
i Journal, supra note 99, at 50.
112 Id. at 50-51. The Subcommittee also reported an early version of the Equal
Protection Clause, which the full Committee decided to consider separately. Id. at 51.
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directly prohibit racial discrimination in voting rights. Rather, it
allowed states to decide whether to engage in such
discrimination, but imposed a penalty-reduced representation
in the House and Electoral College-for those that chose to do
SO.
The Committee approved Stevens' motion to use Article B
as the basis for further deliberations by a vote of 11-3-1.113 The
Committee then voted to change the phrase "citizens of the
United States in each State" in Article B to "persons in each
State, excluding Indians not taxed,"114 and to delete the word
"creed."115
As revised, the proposed constitutional amendment read:
Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned
among the several States which may be included in this
Union, according to their respective numbers, counting
the whole number of persons in each State, excluding
Indians not taxed; provided that whenever the elective
franchise shall be denied or abridged in any State on
account of race or color, all persons of such race or color
shall be excluded from the basis of representation.11 6
On January 20, the Committee voted 13-1-1 to approve this
language'17 and report the proposal to Congress.118
On January 22, Fessenden introduced the Committee's
proposal to the Senate as S.R. No. 22,119 and Stevens did so in
the House as H.R. No. 51.120 Stevens explained that the
proposed amendment:
does not deny to the States the right to regulate the
elective franchise as they please: but it does say to a
State, "If you exclude from the right of suffrage
Frenchmen, Irishmen, or any particular class of people,
none of that class of persons shall be counted in fixing
n1 Id.
114 Id. at 52.
" Journal, supra note 99, at 52-53.
116 Id. at 53.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 53-54.
'" CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 337 (Jan. 22, 1866).
120 Id. at 351 (Jan. 22, 1866).
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your representation in this House. You may allow them
to vote or not, as you please; but if you do not allow them
to vote. .. they shall be excluded from the basis of
representation."121
Rep. Conkling echoed this sentiment, explaining:
Every state will be left free to extend or withhold the
elective franchise on such terms as it pleases, and this
without losing anything in representation if the terms
are impartial as to all. Qualifications of voters may be
required of any kind-qualifications of intelligence, of
property, or of any sort whatever, and yet no loss of
representation shall thereby be suffered.122
Conkling explained that the proposal did not go further, because
requiring States to extend civil and political rights to blacks
would "trench[] upon the principle of existing local sovereignty"
and "meddle[ ] with a right reserved to the States when the
Constitution was adopted."123 Such a mandate also would be
unlikely to be ratified by enough states, since many northern
states either barred blacks from voting, or imposed additional
requirements on them.124
Republicans offered many rationales for the amendment.
Most basically, it was unfair to allow a state to receive increased
political power based on people who could neither directly vote,
nor have their interests indirectly represented by others (which
was the perception for women and children at the time).
Conkling declared that "political representation does not belong
to those who have no political existence."125 He elaborated,
121 Id. (statement of Rep. Stevens); see also id. at 357 (Jan. 22, 1866) (statement of
Rep. Conkling) (distinguishing the proposed amendment from other proposals which
would "deprive the States of the power to disqualify or discriminate politically on account
of race or color"); id. at 358 (Jan. 22, 1866) (statement of Rep. Shellabarger) (recognizing
that the amendment "might be construed to give powers to the States ... in the way of
excluding an entire race from the right of the elective franchise"); id. at 405 (Jan. 24,
1866) (statement of Rep. Shellabarger) (same).
122 Id. at 358 (Jan. 22, 1866) (statement of Rep. Conkling); id. at 376 (Jan. 23, 1866)
(statement of Rep. Stevens) ("[If the law applies impartially to all, then no matter
whether it cuts out white or black," a state's representation will not be reduced).
123 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 358 (Jan. 22, 1866) (statement of Rep.
Conkling).
124 Id.
125 Id. at 356 (Jan. 22, 1866) (statement of Rep. Conkling); see also id. at 377-78
(Jan. 23, 1866) (statement of Rep. Donnelly); accord id. at 379 (Jan. 23, 1866) (statement
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"[W]henever in any State, and so long as a race can be found
which is so low, so bad, so ignorant, so stupid, that it is deemed
necessary to exclude men from the right to vote merely because
they belong to that race, in such case the race shall likewise be
excluded from the sum of Federal power to which that State is
entitled."126 States should "build churches and school-houses,
and found newspapers ... and educate their people till they are
fit to vote."12 7
Rep. William Lawrence warned that, with the abolition of
slavery, southern states' power in Congress would increase
based on their populations of freedmen who were barred from
voting.128 Southern states would "enjoy as the reward of their
perfidy and treason increased political power."129 Echoing this
sentiment, Rep. Martin Russell Thayer pointed out that the
amendment would prevent the former Confederate states from
gaining 12-13 new House seats based on disenfranchised
blacks.130 Rep. Ignatius L. Donnelly, addressing the same issue
from a more cynical or self-interested perspective, urged
northern representatives to vote for the measure in order to
increase the North's representation in Congress, as southern
states were unlikely to overcome their prejudice and
enfranchise blacks.131
Counting disenfranchised blacks when allocating House
seats also would give southern voters much more effective
political power than northern ones. Conkling pointed out that, if
Representatives were allocated based on total population, then
127,000 white people in New York would be entitled to a single
representative, while an equal number of whites in Mississippi
would have three representatives, due to the large number of
disenfranchised blacks there.132
of Rep. Sloan); id. at 404 (Jan. 24, 1866) (statement of Rep. Lawrence).
12r Id. at 358 (Jan. 22, 1866) (statement of Rep. Conkling).
127 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 359 (Jan. 22, 1866) (statement of Rep.
Conkling).
128 Id. at 404 (Jan. 24, 1866) (statement of Rep. Lawrence).
129 Id.; see also id. at 410 (Jan. 24, 1866) (statement of Rep. Cook).
130 Id. at 354 (Jan. 22, 1866) (statement of Rep. Thayer).
131 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 377-78 (Jan. 23, 1866) (statement of Rep.
Donnelly); see also id. at 386 (Jan. 23, 1866) (statement of Rep. Jenckes).
132 Id. at 357 (Jan. 22, 1866) (statement of Rep. Conkling); see also id. at 379 (Jan.
23, 1866) (statement of Rep. Sloan); id.at 404 (Jan. 24, 1866) (statement of Rep.
Lawrence) (noting that, without the amendment, "each rebel voter ... will enjoy a
political power more than double that of every loyal voter of" the North).
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Conkling went on to explain why the proposed amendment
allocated representatives based on total population, subject to a
reduction in representation if certain people were
disenfranchised on racial grounds, rather than based on the
number of voters in each state. Allocating representatives based
on voters, he argued, would unfairly penalize states whose
"young men" had traveled west "in quest of more buoyant
activities and more boundless fields," leaving behind populations
comprised disproportionately of women and children who were
unable to vote.133 A voter-based allocation formula also would
give states the supposedly destructive incentive to extend the
franchise to women, minors, aliens, and recently arrived
inhabitants, just to increase their representation in Congress.134
Congressional Democrats, along with a few Republicans
who supported President Johnson, spoke out against the
resolution. Rep. Andrew J. Rogers argued that reducing
southern states' representation in Congress would be
tantamount to taxation without representation, in violation of
the principles for which the Revolution had been fought.135
Under the proposed amendment, members of a disenfranchised
race would not be taken into account in determining a state's
representation in Congress, yet still would be considered for
purposes of allocating direct taxes among the states.136
Moreover, the Founding Fathers had decided that
representation should be "based upon the numbers of the
people" in each state, rather than the states' respective
"voting population[s]."l37
Rogers further lamented that the proposed amendment
"inflicts upon the States a penalty for refusing to the colored
133 Id. at 357 (Jan. 22, 1866) (statement of Rep. Conkling). Conkling argued that
such concerns were greatly exaggerated, and the only real impact on the free states of
allocating representatives according to their respective numbers of voters would be to
shift a few seats to California. Id. at 358 (Jan. 22, 1866) (statement of Rep. Conkling).
After reviewing the pertinent population figures, he concluded, "[I]t takes so many
'persons' or 'voters' to make up the required constituency for a single [Representative],
that the preponderance of men over women, except in California, is too small in any
State seriously to affect the result." Id.
134 Id. at 357 (Jan. 22, 1866) (statement of Rep. Conkling); id. at 411 (Jan. 24, 1866)
(statement of Rep. Cook).
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population an unqualified right of suffrage which it does not
inflict upon them for refusing the same thing to the white
population."138 At the time, minors, women, foreigners, and
people who failed to satisfy property or educational
qualifications for voting were counted in a state's population for
representation purposes, despite their ineligibility to vote.
Rogers claimed that states should have similar discretion to
withhold the franchise from blacks without suffering a loss of
representation.139 He contended that the proposed amendment
aimed "to debase and degrade the white race" and place blacks
"upon a higher [constitutional] footing than the white [man]." 4 0
By stripping states of representation in Congress, the
amendment indirectly attempted to "compel" them "to adopt
unqualified negro suffrage."141
The magnitude of the penalty, he maintained,
was unreasonable:
[I]f New Jersey pass[es] a law allowing such of her black
population to vote as can read the Constitution of the
United States, and although every negro in that State
could take advantage of that qualification and could read
the Constitution of the United States except one, then
New Jersey would lose the advantage of representation
for the whole of that population.14 2
Rogers concluded by maintaining that the decision to ratify the
proposed amendment should be made, if at all, by specially
elected conventions, rather than legislatures whose members
were not elected with regard to this issue.143
138 Id.
139 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 353 (Jan. 22, 1866) (statement of Rep.
Rogers); see also id. at 354 (Jan. 22, 1866) (statement of Rep. Rogers); id. at 380 (Jan. 23,
1866) (statement of Rep. Orth) (pointing out that Indiana would lose representation
under the proposal because it disenfranchised blacks while Massachusetts would not,
even though it disenfranchised just as many people due to purported ignorance); id. at
388 (Jan. 23, 1866) (statement of Rep. Trimble) ("A large portion of the white citizens of
this country . .. are denied representation here, and no eloquent voice is raised in their
behalf to-day; but the African has numberless champions to plead in favor of his right to
vote."); id. at 448-49 (Jan. 26, 1866) (statement of Rep. Harding).
140 Id. at 354 (Jan. 22, 1866) (statement of Rep. Rogers).
141 Id.
142 Id. at 355 (Jan. 22, 1866) (statement of Rep. Rogers).




A wide range of other counterarguments was also raised.
Rep. Charles A. Eldredge argued there was no constitutional
basis for requiring southern states to approve the amendment as
a condition for regaining representation in Congress.144 Other
Representatives similarly objected that the amendment
primarily affected southern states, yet was being drafted and
debated without their delegates present.145 Rep. James Brooks
attacked the proposal as hypocritical, since it penalized states
for refusing blacks the right to vote while permitting them to
disenfranchise Indians and women.1 4 6 Rep. John W. Chanler
forthrightly opposed it on the grounds that it would allow
blacks, due to their numbers, to control the South;147 Rep.
Lawrence S. Trimble declared that it interfered with
state sovereignty.1 4 8
Several radical Republicans also opposed the measure, but
for diametrically opposite reasons: they contended that the
amendment did not go far enough in protecting blacks and
implementing the principles upon which the nation was
founded. Many Republicans emphasized that the amendment
would dilute the Constitution's requirement that states
maintain a republican form of government, by implicitly
authorizing them to disenfranchise large fractions of
their populations.14 9
Another major concern was that southern states would be
able to evade the amendment's prohibition on racial
discrimination too easily.150 Several Representatives pointed out
that the proposal allowed states to effectively disenfranchise
blacks by imposing voting qualifications other than race, such as
property requirements.15 1 Rep. Jenckes explained that, if South
144 Id. at 425 (Jan. 25, 1866) (statement of Rep. Eldredge); see also id. at 487-88
(Jan. 29, 1866) (statement of Rep. Raymond).
' Id. at 426 (Jan. 25, 1866) (statement of Rep. Strouse).
141 Id. at 379-80 (Jan. 23, 1866) (statement of Rep. Brooks).
14 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 382 (Jan. 23, 1866) (statement of Rep.
Chanler).
14 Id. at 387-88 (Jan. 23, 1866) (statement of Rep. Trimble).
149 See, e.g., id. at 428 (Jan. 25, 1866) (statement of Rep. Higby).
1s0 Id. at 378 (Jan. 23, 1866) (statement of Rep. Sloan); see also id. at 406 (Jan. 24,
1866) (statement of Rep. Shellabarger).
151 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 385 (Jan. 23, 1866) (statement of Rep. Baker)
(emphasizing that the amendment allows a state to "disenfranchise whom she pleases
and to any extent she pleases," so long as the basis is not race or color); id. at 386-87
(Jan. 23, 1866) (statement of Rep. Jenckes) (pointing out that a state could impose
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Carolina permitted blacks to vote, but reinstated the
requirement from its constitution of 1790 that a person must
own property or pay a tax to be eligible to vote, then most blacks
still could be excluded from the political process without
triggering a reduction in the state's representation in
Congress.152 These Members declared that states should not be
able to exercise political power based on disenfranchised
segments of their populations.153
The House discussed a variety of alternate solutions.
Jenckes urged that the amendment should expressly specify
qualifications for voting, rather than leave it to the states.15 4
Rep. John F. Farnsworth, also advocating a more direct
approach, recommended that the amendment flatly prohibit
states from disenfranchising their citizens, particularly based on
race or color.155 Other Representatives argued that the
amendment should either base representation on the number of
voters in each state5 6 or, more narrowly, the number of male
citizens who were at least 21 years old and eligible to vote.15 7
It should be noted that both sides agreed that the term
"abridge," as used in the proposal, referred to the imposition of
qualifications to vote for blacks, such as property or intelligence
requirements, that did not also apply to white people.15 8 A
requirement hat applied to persons of all races did not "abridge"
anyone's right to vote on account of race.159 Conkling explained:
restrictions on the franchise "of age, of residence, of previous servitude, and of ignorance
or poverty," or even exclude Union supporters); see also id. at 404 (Jan. 24, 1866)
(statement of Rep. Lawrence); id. at 406 (Jan. 24, 1866) (statement of Rep. Eliot).
152 Id. at 376 (Jan. 23, 1866) (statement of Rep. Jenckes); see also id. at 386 (Jan. 23,
1866) (statement of Rep. Jenckes); id. at 383 (Jan. 23, 1866) (statement of Rep.
Farnsworth). Democratic Rep. Samuel S. Marshall raised the interesting objection that
the proposal was overbroad in a manner harmful to blacks. If a Southern state allowed
some fraction of its black population to vote, but continued to discriminate against others
(for example, by imposing a property or education requirement just upon blacks), then
all blacks would be removed from that State's basis for representation, thereby reducing
the political power of even enfranchised members of the race. Id. at 411 (Jan. 24, 1866)
(statement of Rep. Marshall).
153 See, e.g., id. at 406 (Jan. 24, 1866) (statement of Rep. Shellabarger).
'5 Id. at 386 (Jan. 23, 1866) (statement of Rep. Jenckes).
15s CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 383 (Jan. 23, 1866) (statement of Rep.
Farnsworth); see also id. at 405 (Jan. 24, 1866) (statement of Rep. Shellabarger).
156 Id. at 380-81 (Jan. 23, 1866) (statement of Rep. Orth).
157 Id. at 378 (Jan. 23, 1866) (statement of Rep. Sloan).
158 See, e.g., id. at 353 (Jan. 22, 1866) (statement of Rep. Rogers).




"[I]f any State should impose qualifications alike upon
white and black, and those qualifications thus
impartially imposed should happen to include negroes,
because they could not come up to them, notwithstanding
that the State would be entitled to its entire negro
population for this purpose of representation."160
Due to the Democrats' opposition to protecting blacks'
voting rights, as well as the concern of radical Republicans that
the proposed amendment did not go far enough, Rep. Griswold
moved to recommit it to the Joint Committee without
instructions.16 1 He explained that he wished "to get the question
back to the committee, so that they may express their views and
give a report in the light of the discussion which has taken place
for the last few days."16 2 Griswold felt that, if the Joint
Committee deliberated further about the debates in the House,
both the House and the public would have greater confidence in
whatever amendment it reported, even if the revised version had
only the "slightest possible variation" from the Committee's
current proposal.163 Stevens cautioned, "[I]f it goes to the
committee we have nothing to guide us. There has been no
indication of the disposition of the House. Let us have
instructions so that we may know what is the sense of the
House."16 4 The House nevertheless voted on January 30, 1866, to
recommit the measure to the Joint Committee without
instructions,16 5 and permitted members to submit their
proposals directly to the Committee.166
160 Id. at 354 (Jan. 22, 1866) (statement of Rep. Conkling).
161 Id. at 492 (Jan. 29, 1866) (statement of Rep. Griswold).
162 Id.; see also id. at 493 (Jan. 29, 1866) (statement of Rep. Griswold) ("My object is
to get before the committee the result of this entire discussion so that they may consider
it in the light of that discussion.").
163 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 493 (Jan. 29, 1866) (statement of Rep.
Griswold); see also id. at 492 (Jan. 29, 1866) (statement of Rep. Lawrence) (agreeing that
"[n]o injury can result from that course," because the House was free to debate issues
when the Committee reported its revised proposal).
'64 Id. at 492 (Jan. 29, 1866) (statement of Rep. Stevens).
16 Id. at 508 (Jan. 30, 1866); see also Journal, supra note 98, at 58 (Jan. 31, 1866).
166 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 509 (Jan. 30, 1866); see also id. at 512 (Jan.
30, 1866) (proposal of Rep. Ashley).
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B. The Committee's Revised Proposal
On January 31, the day after the House returned the
proposed amendment to the Joint Committee, the Committee
modified it by removing the phrase "and direct taxes."16 7 It
rejected Sen. Reverdy Johnson's recommendation that, if a state
"denie[s] or abridge[s]" anyone's right to vote for any reason, all
people of that race should be excluded from the state's basis of
representation.1 6 8 The Committee also declined, by a one-vote
margin (6-7, with two members not voting),169 to reduce a state's
representation if it disqualifies a person from voting based on
his "former condition of slavery,"o70 most likely on the grounds
that the draft's language concerning racial discrimination
already indirectly achieved that goal.171 The Committee reported
the slightly modified version of the amendment back to Congress
by a vote of 10-4-1,172 and it was re-introduced into the House
as H.R. No. 51.173
Responding to Republicans' earlier critiques, Stevens
explained that the proposed amendment did not grant states
new authority to disenfranchise blacks, but rather penalized the
exercise of their pre-existing power to do so.174 If Congress
attempted to go further and establish qualifications for voting,
or directly prohibit states from denying the franchise to certain
groups of people, it was unlikely that enough states would ratify
the amendment for it to become part of the Constitution.17 5
Stevens recognized that southern states would not
immediately enfranchise blacks, but viewed that as a virtue of
the proposal, because the South's representation in Congress
167 Journal, supra note 99, at 58 (Jan. 31, 1866); see also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. 535 (Jan. 31, 1866) (statement of Rep. Stevens).
16s Journal, supra note 99, at 59 (Jan. 31, 1866).
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 537 (Jan. 31, 1866) (statement of Rep.
Stevens) ("[E]xclusion[ ] on account of previous condition of slavery[ I must be an
exclusion on account of race or color.").
172 Journal, supra note 99, at 59-60 (Jan. 31, 1866).
173 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 535 (Jan. 31, 1866).
174 Id. at 536 (Jan. 31, 1866) (statement of Rep. Stevens).
175 Id. ("[I]f you should take away the right which now is and always has been
exercised by the States, by fixing the qualification of their electors, instead of getting




would be substantially reduced.176 He did not want the former
Confederacy to be fully represented until Congress "ha[d] done
the great work of regenerating the Constitution and laws of the
country according to the principles of the Declaration of
Independence."'7 In the meantime, "our Christian men shall go
among the freedmen and teach them what their duties are as
citizens."178 After four or five years, "when these freedmen ...
shall have become intelligent enough, and there are sufficient
loyal men [in the South] to control the representation from those
States," the southern states would resume their full
representation in Congress.179
Rep. Robert C. Schenck proposed a substitute that would
apportion Representatives based on the number of male voters
in each state who were at least twenty-one years old.o80 Rep.
John F. Benjamin pointed out that Schenck's proposal would
disadvantage loyal states with large rebel populations that were
not permitted to vote.'8 It also would cause northern states with
large populations of non-citizen immigrants who were ineligible
to vote to lose 15-20 representatives.18 2 Those states would
never ratify such a measure.83 Moreover, such a standard was
impracticable to administer in states such as Missouri that
required voters to take oaths at the time they deposited their
ballots, affirming they had not been involved in the rebellion.184
The House rejected Schenck's ubstitute by a vote of 29-131-
23.185 Later that day-the same day the Committee returned the
proposed amendment to the House-the House passed the Joint
176 Id. at 536 (Jan. 31, 1866) (statement of Rep. Stevens).
"7 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 536 (Jan. 31, 1866) (statement of Rep.
Stevens).
178 Id.
179 Id. In the course of this debate, a Representative equated fallen Union soldiers
with dead Confederates, hailing both equally as "the dead of the nation." Stevens replied
that if "the loyal dead" heard such a pronouncement, they "would have broken the
cerements of the tomb and stalked forth and haunted him until his eye-balls were
seared." Id. at 538 (Jan. 31, 1866) (statement of Rep. Stevens).
18o Id. at 535 (Jan. 31, 1866) (statement of Rep. Schenck).
181 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 535 (Jan. 31, 1866) (statement of Rep.
Benjamin).
182 Id. at 537 (Jan. 31, 1866) (statement of Rep. Stevens).
183 Id.
184 Id. at 535-36 (Jan. 31, 1866) (statement of Rep. Benjamin).
'8s CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 538 (Jan. 31, 1866).
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Committee's proposal by a vote of 120-46-16, more than the
two-thirds required for passage.186
The Senate began considering the revised version of H.R.
No. 51 a few days later.1 8 7 Fessenden explained that the Joint
Committee removed the phrase "and direct taxes" because many
House members thought that the amendment was "stronger"
without it.188 The phrase also was unnecessary because the
Constitution already levies taxes according to population.18 9
Numerous Senators expressed concern about the proposal
and offered amendments. Sen. Charles Sumner believed that it
compromised on basic human rights by affirmatively enshrining
in the Constitution states' right to deny blacks the franchise.190
Guaranteeing the right to vote for blacks was necessary to fully
realize the promises of the Declaration of Independence;191
ensure that each state's government was truly "republican," as
the Constitution requires;192 and avert a "terrible" race war
between freedmen and their former masters, who would
continue to mistreat and marginalize them despite the abolition
of slavery.193
Sumner suggested replacing the proposed constitutional
amendment with a bill prohibiting any "Oligarchy, Aristocracy,
Caste, or Monopoly invested with peculiar privileges and
powers," or any "denial of rights, civil or political, on account of
color or race" anywhere in the United States.194 The proposed
legislation further specified that "all persons . . . shall be equal
before the law, whether in the court-room or at the ballot-
186 Id.
"" Id. at 644 (Feb. 5, 1866) (statement of Sen. Fessenden); see also id. at 520 (Jan.
31, 1866) (initial introduction of proposal); id. at 1283 (Mar. 9, 1866) (reading proposal).
The Senate approved a few modifications proposed by Senator Clark that did not
substantively affect the measure, id. at 1287 (Mar. 9, 1866) (proposal of Sen. Clark); see
also id. at 1284 (Mar. 9, 1866) (proposal of Sen. Clark), but those modifications were
omitted from the final version of the amendment hat the Senate voted upon, id. at 1288
(Mar. 9, 1866).
18 Id. at 703 (Feb. 7, 1866) (statement of Sen. Fessenden).
188 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 703 (Feb. 7, 1866) (statement of Sen.
Fessenden).
190 Id. at 673 (Feb. 6, 1866) (statement of Sen. Sumner).
191 Id. at 674 (Feb. 6, 1866) (statement of Sen. Sumner).
192 Id. at 675, 684 (Feb. 6, 1866) (statement of Sen. Sumner).
193 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 675 (Feb. 6, 1866) (statement of Sen.
Sumner).
194 Id. at 674 (Feb. 6, 1866) (proposal of Sen. Sumner); see also id. at 1283 (Mar. 9,
1866) (reading Sumner's proposal).
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box."195 The bill concluded by stating that it "shall be the
supreme law of the land, anything in the Constitution or laws of
any State to the contrary notwithstanding."19 6 He later modified
the proposal to limit its applicability exclusively to former
Confederate states.197 The Senate rejected Sumner's plan by a
vote of 8 to 39.198
The Senate also rejected three other proposals that would
have prohibited racial discrimination in granting the franchise.
It voted 8 to 38 to reject another amendment Sumner proposed
that provided, "And the elective franchise shall not be denied or
abridged in any State on account of race or color."199 It likewise
voted 10 to 37 to reject Sen. John B. Henderson's suggestion to
replace the Joint Committee's proposal with: "No state, in
prescribing the qualifications requisite for electors therein shall
discriminate against any person on account of color or race."200
Sen. Richard Yates' proposal would have gone even further,
prohibiting states from discriminating in any respect based on
race, color, or previous condition of servitude, particularly with
regard to all "civil and political rights, including the right of
suffrage."201 This measure received the least support, suffering
defeat by a vote of 7 to 38.202
After over a month of debate,203 the Senate ultimately voted
on the original text of the resolution as it emerged from the
1s Id. at 674 (Feb. 6, 1866) (proposal of Sen. Sumner).
196 Id.
197 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1287 (Mar. 9, 1866).
198 Id.
'99 Id. at 1288 (Mar. 9, 1866). Sumner also proposed modifying the last sentence of
the Joint Committee's draft to read, "[A]lI persons therein of such race or color shall be
excluded from the basis of representation, and they shall be exempt from taxation of all
kinds." Id. at 811 (Feb. 13, 1866) (proposal of Sen. Sumner). Sumner later changed his
mind and withdrew that amendment. Id. at 852 (Feb. 15, 1866).
200 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 702 (Feb. 7, 1866) (proposal of Sen.
Henderson); id, at 1283 (Mar. 9, 1866) (reviewing Henderson's proposal); id. at 1284
(Mar. 9, 1866) (rejecting Henderson's proposal).
201 Id. at 1287 (Mar. 9, 1866) (proposal of Sen. Yates).
202 Id.
203 See id. at 673-87 (Feb. 6, 1866); id. at 702-08 (Feb. 7, 1866); id. at 736-42 (Feb.
8, 1866); id. at 763-70 (Feb. 9, 1866); id. at 810-11 (Feb. 13, 1866); id. at 831-35 (Feb.
14, 1866); id. at 876-86 (Feb. 16, 1866); id. at 957-65 (Feb. 21, 1866); id. at 981-91 (Feb.
23, 1866); id. at 1180-84 (Mar. 5, 1866); id. at 1203 (Mar. 6, 1866); id. at 1224-33 (Mar.
7, 1866); id. at 1254-58 (Mar. 8, 1866).
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Committee.204 The vote was 25-22, falling short of the two-
thirds majority necessary for a constitutional amendment.205
C. The Replacement Proposals
Following the defeat of the Joint Committee's proposal,
more members came forward with their own plans. Among the
most prominent was Sen. William M. Stewart's proposed
constitutional amendment that expressly prohibited "[a]ll
discriminations among the people because of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude, either in civil rights or the right
of suffrage."206 The resolution was referred to the Joint
Committee,207 which Stewart addressed "at length in support
and advocacy" of the measure.208 Since his proposal would have
enabled southern states to regain representation in Congress
while continuing to effectively disenfranchise blacks through
educational or property requirements, the Committee took no
action on it.209
A few weeks later, in early April, an English reformer
named Robert Dale Owen proposed a plan to Stevens, who
introduced it to the Committee.210 The proposal stated, in
pertinent part:
Section 2-"From and after [July 4, 1876], no
discrimination shall be made by any state, nor by the
United States, as to the enjoyment by classes of persons
of the right of suffrage, because of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude."
204 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1288-89 (Mar. 9, 1866).
205 Id. at 1289 (Mar. 9, 1866).
206 Id. at 1906 (Apr. 12, 1866) (proposal of Sen. Stewart). Stewart previously had
proposed a statute, S.R. No. 48, that would have permitted a southern state to send
representatives to Congress only if, among other things, it amended its constitution to
prohibit all "distinctions" based on race, color, or previous condition of servitude with
regard to civil rights and the franchise. Id. at 1437-38 (Mar. 16, 1866) (proposal of Sen.
Stewart). The measure had been referred to the Joint Committee. Id. at 1438 (Mar. 16,
1866).
207 Id. at 1906 (Apr. 12, 1866).
2 Journal, supra note 99, at 82 (Apr. 16, 1866).
209 Joint Committee History, supra note 93, at 295.
210 Journal, supra note 99, at 83 (Apr. 21, 1866); see also Joint Committee History,
supra note 92, at 296.
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Section 3-"Until [July 4, 18761, no class of persons, as to
the right of any of whom to suffrage discrimination shall
be made by any state, because of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude, shall be included in the basis of
representation."211
The Committee accepted Stevens' recommendation to delete
§ 2,212 as well as Williams' motion to replace § 3 with the
following language (which became the new § 2):
Representatives hall be apportioned among the several
states which may be included within this Union
according to their respective numbers, counting the
whole number of persons in each State excluding Indians
not taxed. But whenever in any State the elective
franchise shall be denied to any portion of its male
citizens, not less than twenty-one years of age, or in any
way abridged, except for participation in rebellion or
other crime, the basis of representation in such state
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of
such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens not less than twenty-one years of age.2 13
The Committee also inserted the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, Due Process Clause, and Equal Protection Clause as § 1
of the proposal.214
The Committee ultimately voted 12-3 to report the
complete amendment to Congress.215 Stevens later told Owen
that the Committee modified his proposal because recent
Republican caucuses in New York, Illinois, and Indiana had
come out strongly against black suffrage.216
211 Journal, supra note 99, at 83-84 (Apr. 21, 1866). The Committee accepted each of
these proposals by wide margins. Id. at 84-86. After a few days of deliberation on other
related matters, it voted 7-6-2 in favor of reporting the amendment, id. at 97, 99 (Apr.
25, 1866), but passed a motion to reconsider shortly thereafter, id. at 100, so that further
changes could be made to the language.
212 Id. at 101 (Apr. 28, 1866).
213 Id. at 102 (Apr. 28, 1866).
214 Id. at 106 (Apr. 28, 1866).
215 Journal, supra note 99, at 114 (Apr. 28, 1866); see also id. at 115-17.
216 Joint Committee History, supra note 93, at 302.
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Stevens reported this draft to the House on April 30,
1866,217 and the House began considering it a week later.
Stevens emphasized that the Committee's latest proposal was
"all that can be obtained in the present state of public
opinion .... [W]e did not believe that nineteen of the loyal
States could be induced to ratify any proposition more stringent
than this."218 Reminding the House how the Senate had
repudiated the Joint Committee's previous proposal, he
lamented that the earlier version of the amendment had been
"mortally wounded in the house of its friends."219
Explaining § 2, which he called "the most important in the
article," Stevens stated:
If any State shall exclude any of her adult male citizens
from the elective franchise, or abridge that right, she
shall forfeit her right to representation in the same
proportion. The effect of this provision will be either to
compel the States to grant universal suffrage or so to
shear them of their power as to keep them forever in a
hopeless minority in the national Government, both
legislative and executive.220
He admitted the proposal was "not as good" as the one the
Senate had rejected, which would have excluded all blacks from
a state's basis of representation if it discriminated against any of
them.2 2 1 The new proposal, in contrast, "allow[ed] the States to
discriminate among the same class, and receive proportionate
credit in representation."2 2 2 He reiterated:
True it will take two, three, possibly five years before
[southern whites] conquer their prejudices sufficiently to
allow their late slaves to become their equals at the polls.
That short delay would not be injurious. In the mean
time the freedmen would become more enlightened, and
more fit to discharge the high duties of their new
217 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2286 (Apr. 30, 1866).
218 Id. at 2459 (May 8, 1866) (statement of Rep. Stevens).
219 Id.
220 Id. (emphasis added).
221 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459-60 (Apr. 30, 1866) (statement of Rep
Stevens).
222 Id. at 2460 (Apr. 30, 1866) (statement of Rep. Stevens).
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condition. In that time, too, the loyal Congress could
mature their laws and so amend the Constitution as to
secure the rights of every human being, and render
dilution impossible.223
Stevens also explained that subsequent legislation would be
necessary to implement §2:
[I1f this amendment prevails you must legislate to carry
out many parts of it. You must legislate for the purpose of
ascertaining the basis of representation. You must
legislate for registry such as they have in Maryland. It
will not execute itself, but as soon as it becomes a law,
Congress at the next session will legislate to carry it
out . . . .224
Democrats objected that blacks should not have the right "to
marry a white woman [or] the right to vote."2 2 5 They also
continued to oppose the measure on the grounds that it was a
"mere scheme to deny representation to eleven States; to
prevent indefinitely a complete restoration of the Union and
perpetuate the power of a sectional and dangerous party."226
Additionally, several Members reiterated their objection to
considering constitutional amendments affecting the southern
states while those states were excluded from Congress.227
Other members conveyed concern about constitutional
amendments being "offered and passed" with too "much haste
and facility." 228 Rep. Fernando C. Beaman expressed his
disappointment with the Committee's proposal, but recognized,
"[P]erhaps it is as nearly satisfactory as any system that could
have been agreed on with any well-founded hope of adoption."22 9
223 Id. at 2459 (Apr. 30, 1866) (statement of Rep. Stevens).
224 Id. at 2544 (May 10, 1866) (statement of Rep. Stevens).
225 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2538 (May 10, 1866) (statement of Rep.
Rogers).
226 Id. at 2461 (May 8, 1866) (statement of Rep. Finck).
227 Id. at 2461-62 (May 8, 1866) (statement of Rep. Finck); see also id. at 2530 (May
10, 1866) (statement of Rep. Randall); id. at 2531 (May 10, 1866) (statement of Rep.
Strouse).
228 Id. at 2531 (May 10, 1866) (statement of Rep. Strouse).
229 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2537 (May 10, 1866) (statement of Rep.
Beaman).
279] 319
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
The amendment ultimately passed the House by a vote of 128 to
37, with 19 members not voting.230
The Senate was deeply divided over the proposed
amendment. Sen. Jacob M. Howard explained that §2 "leaves
the right to regulate the elective franchise still with the States,
and does not meddle with that right."2 31 Under the proposal,
"where a State excludes any part of its male citizens from the
elective franchise, it shall lose Representatives in proportion to
the number so excluded."232 The penalty will be triggered "no
matter what may be the occasion of the restriction . . . whether a
want of education, a want of property, a want of color, or a want
of anything else."2 3 3 Howard would have preferred guaranteeing
either universal suffrage, or at least "restricted, qualified
suffrage for the colored race," but such proposals were unlikely
to be ratified.234 He further clarified that a state "abridges" the
right to vote for purposes of § 2 if it "permit[s] one person to vote
for a member of the State Legislature, but prohibit the same
person from voting for a Representative, in Congress."235
Republican Sen. Benjamin F. Wade opposed the proposal,
arguing, "[M]any believe there are good reasons, for restricting
universal suffrage, and upon such principles as not to justify the
inflicting of a punishment or penalty upon a State which adopts
restricted suffrage . . . . [A] State has the right to try that
experiment" without losing her full representation
in Congress.236
In late May, the Republican Senators caucused together for
several days and hammered out several modifications to the
House's proposal.237 Following the caucus, Sen. George H.
Williams implemented their decision by proposing a modified
version of § 2 that read:
230 Id. at 2545 (May 10, 1866).
231 Id. at 2766 (May 23, 1866) (statement of Sen. Howard).
232 Id. at 2767 (May 23, 1866) (statement of Sen. Howard).
233 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2767 (May 23, 1866) (statement of Sen.
Howard).
234 Id. at 2766 (May 23, 1866) (statement of Sen. Howard).
235 Id. at 2767 (May 23, 1866) (statement of Sen. Howard).
236 Id. at 2769 (May 23, 1866) (statement of Sen. Wade).




Representatives hall be apportioned among the several
States according to their respective numbers, counting
the whole number of persons in each State, excluding
Indians not taxed. But whenever the right to vote at any
election held under the Constitution and laws of the
United States, or of any State, is denied to any of the
male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of
age and citizens of the United States, or in any way
abridged except for participation in rebellion or other
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be
reduced in the proportion which the number of such male
citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such State.2 3 8
Howard claimed that the proposal simplified §2 without
altering its effects.2 39 Williams explained that this revised
version replaced the phrase "the elective franchise" with "the
right to vote any election held under the Constitution and laws
of the United States or of any State," to clarify that a state
would be subject to a reduction in representation if it barred a
person from voting in any election, not just elections for the U.S.
House.240 Sen. Johnson complained that it was ambiguous
whether a State would suffer reduced representation if it
prevented its citizens from voting in city or county elections in
places other than where they live, or because of other voting
qualifications specific to local elections.241 Henderson raised a
similar concern about eligibility to vote for local public school
officials.242
Henderson, a Republican, went on to object that the
amendment did not go far enough. He declared that the
amendment affirmed "the propriety[] of excluding arbitrarily a
freeman from the elective franchise."243 He also claimed that it
238 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2991 (June 6, 1866) (proposal of Sen.
Williams); accord id. at 3026 (June 8, 1866) (proposal of Sen. Williams).
239 Id. at 2991 (June 6, 1866) (statement of Sen. Howard); see also id. at 3010 (June
7, 1866) (statement of Sen. Henderson).
240 Id. at 2991 (June 6, 1866) (statement of Sen. Williams); accord id. at 3010 (June
7, 1866) (statement of Sen. Fessenden).
241 Id. at 2991 (June 6, 1866) (statement of Sen. Johnson); see also id. at 3027 (June
8, 1866) (statement of Sen. Johnson).
242 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3010 (June 7, 1866) (statement of Sen.
Henderson).
243 Id. at 3033 (June 8, 1866) (statement of Sen. Henderson).
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permitted states to disenfranchise whites (likely referring to
women) and aliens "without loss of representative power."244
Finally, it presented "too great an incentive to the States to
extend suffrage to persons who are ignorant and uneducated for
the mere purpose of acquiring power," to prevent such people
from being "excluded from the basis of representation."245
Henderson then suggested an amendment to the Republican
caucus' proposed modification of §2, to make it more specific.246
Under his revision, the penalty clause would be triggered
"whenever the right to vote for Governor, judges, or members of
either branch of the Legislature is denied by any State to any of
its male inhabitants being twenty-one years of age."2 4 7 The
Senate adopted his amendment by a vote of 20 to 7,248 thereby
removing potential concerns about § 2's applicability to local
elections. The next day, Williams tweaked this language further,
so that it referred to "the right to vote at any election for the
choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United
States, Representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial
officers of a State, or members of the Legislature thereof."249
Several opponents objected that it would be too difficult to
determine the number of people who have been disenfranchised
for improper, as opposed to permissible, reasons.250 Johnson
added that it was unfair to require a southern state to "agree to
an amendment which was to deprive her of a part of her
representation unless she would consent to abandon a policy
which she had adopted from the beginning of her existence."251
Echoing Henderson, he also pointed out that, under the
amendment, aliens, women, minors, former rebels, and
244 Id.
245 id.




249 Id. at 3029 (June 8, 1866) (proposal of Sen. Williams); accord id. at 3038 (June 8,
1866) (statement of Sen. Pomeroy) (noting that Williams had "modified" the Republican
caucus' proposed substitute version of § 2).
250 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3026 (June 8, 1866) (statement of Sen.
Cowan); id. at 3038 (June 8, 1866) (statement of Sen. Howard).
251 Id. at 3030 (June 8, 1866) (statement of Sen. Johnson); see also id. at 3029 (June
8, 1866) (statement of Sen. Johnson) (protesting that § 2 would "strip the South of a
portion of her representation unless she will agree to change her suffrage laws").
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criminals still could be excluded from voting.252 Johnson further
argued, ironically, that the amendment harmed blacks' rights
because it would "deny" them "the right to be represented" in
the House by reducing the number of representatives allocated
to their states of residence, "simply because they are not
permitted to exercise the right of voting."253
Howard, a Republican, argued that the term "abridged" was
too vague.254 "It is an invitation to raise questions of
construction, and it will be followed ... with an unending train
of disputations in courts of justice and elsewhere, and there is no
possibility of foreseeing what in the end will be the decision of
the Supreme Court as to the meaning of the language 'or in any
way abridged."255 The Senate rejected an amendment that
would have deleted that term, however.256 A week later, in mid-
June, it voted to replace the version of § 2 that the House passed
with the Republican caucus' alternative, as amended by
Williams,257 and then passed the entire Fourteenth Amendment
by a vote of 33 to 11.258 The House concurred in the Senate's
amendments 120-32-32, thereby officially proposing the
Fourteenth Amendment to the States for ratification.2 59
Section 2's legislative history confirms the propriety of a
remedial equilibration interpretation. Throughout most of the
debates surrounding the various drafts of the provision that
eventually became §2, its authors and proponents candidly
recognized that it does not require states to permit anyone to
vote, but rather only reduces states' representation in Congress
if they choose to deny that right to certain categories of
people.260 Indeed, many representatives were concerned that the
252 Id. at 3027 (June 8, 1866) (statement of Sen. Johnson).
253 Id. at 3029 (June 8, 1866) (statement of Sen. Johnson).
254 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3039 (June 8, 1866) (statement of Sen.
Howard); id. at 3040 (June 8, 1866) (statement of Sen. Hendricks).
255 Id. at 3039 (June 8, 1866) (statement of Sen. Howard).
256 Id. at 3040 (June 8, 1866).
257 Id. (adopting, in the Committee of the Whole, Williams' modified version of the
Republican caucus' proposal as an amendment to the version of § 2 approved by the
House); see also id. at 3041 (June 8, 1866) (concurring on amendment made in the
Committee of the Whole).
258 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3042 (June 8, 1866) (approving final version
of the Fourteenth Amendment).
259 Id. at 3149 (June 14, 1866).
260 See supra notes 217, 219 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 173, 187
and accompanying text.
279] 323
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
proposal did not go far enough, precisely because it did not
affirmatively compel states to permit anyone to vote.261
Even if the Fourteenth Amendment right to vote is directly
enforceable through injunctive relief, the amendment's framers
viewed reduction in representation as a primary-if not sole-
remedy for violations of that right. Section 2's legislative history
thus confirms that the severity of that remedy is a legitimate-
indeed, critical-consideration in attempting to ascertain that
right's scope.
II. THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO VOTE
Congress' actions following the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment yield further insight into the scope of
the right to vote as originally understood by § 2's framers. In
December 1868, the Senate passed a resolution requiring the
Senate Judiciary Committee to draft a bill to apportion
representatives in compliance with § 2,262 but the session ended
before the committee could act.2 6 3
The following year, in preparation for the Ninth Census, the
House Select Committee on the Census reviewed the
constitution and laws of each state in the nation to identify
those which violated or abridged the right to vote of male
citizens who were at least twenty-one years old.2 6 4 Its report
identified the types of voting restrictions that violated the right
to vote and the number of states that had adopted them:
261 See supra notes 229-33, 241-43 and accompanying test; see also supra note 189
and accompanying text.
262 CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 158 (Dec. 19, 1868) (statement of Sen.
Harlan).
263 Zuckerman, supra note 90, at 107.
26 H.R. REP. No. 41-3, at 52 (1869-70).
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1. On account of race or color
2. On account of residence on
lands of United States
On account of residence less
than required time in United
States
On account of residence in
State less than required time,
(six different specifications)
On account of residence in





of taxes, (eight specifications)
4. Wanting literary qualifications,
(two specifications)
5. On account of character or
behavior, (two specifications)
6. On account of service in army
or navy
7. On account of pauperism,
idiocy, and insanity, (seven
specifications)
8. Requiring certain oaths as
preliminary to voting, (two
specifications)














The committee report directed the Department of the
Interior to determine the number of citizens of age in each state
that these provisions prevented from voting.2 66 The committee
also reported a bill requiring the Interior Department to count
the number of "[m]ale citizens of the United States twenty-one
years of age, whose right to vote is denied or abridged on other
265 Id. at 52-53; see also id. at 71-93.
266 Id. at 53.
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grounds than rebellion or other crime."2 67 The bill further
required the Secretary of the Interior to reduce states' bases for
representation based on those figures.268
At the behest of committee chair Rep. James Garfield,
however, the House deleted these provisions from the bill. 26 9 He
pointed out that the Fifteenth Amendment was in the process of
being ratified. The bill would cause many states with racially
discriminatory voting laws to lose seats in the House for the
next decade, even though such laws were going to be nullified
imminently.270 The House agreed to delay considering reductions
in representation under § 2 until its next session.271
Despite Congress' failure to pass this measure, the Interior
Department included a column in the Census counting the
number of white male citizens twenty-one or older in each state
who were disenfranchised.2 72 The following session, the House
passed a resolution directing the Interior Department to provide
that data to it.273 The number of disenfranchised citizens
reported in each state was fairly small.2 74 The Secretary of the
Interior cautioned that the department was "disposed to give but
little credit to the returns made by assistant marshals in regard
to the denial or abridgement of suffrage," on the grounds that
they were ill-equipped to handle the "numerous questions of
difficulty and nicety" such determinations required.275 Professor
Zuckerman points out that, throughout the South, except for
Texas, "the number of adult male citizens who were
disenfranchised amounted to less than 0.5 percent."2 7 6 Members
of Congress attacked the results as "utterly inaccurate"277 and
"unreliable."278
267 CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (Dec. 8, 1869) (statement of Rep. Garfield).
268 Id. at 40 (Dec. 8, 1869) (statement of Rep. Hoar).
269 Id. at 127 (Dec. 14, 1869).
270 Id. at 124 (Dec. 14, 1869) (statement of Rep. Garfield).
271 CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 127 (Dec. 14, 1869).
272 Zuckerman, supra note 90, at 110.
273 CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (Dec. 7, 1871).
274 Id. at 66 (Dec. 11, 1871).
275 Id. (correspondence from Secretary of the Interior Columbus Delano).
276 Zuckerman, supra note 90, at 112.
277 CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 2d Sess. 79 (Dec. 12, 1871) (statement of Rep.
Mercur).
278 Id. at 670 (Jan. 29, 1872) (statement of Sen. Morrill).
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Representative Garfield pointed out that Rhode Island and
Arkansas each stood to lose a representative based on the
Census results concerning disenfranchised voters.279 Congress
concluded, however, that the numbers of disenfranchised voters
in each state according to the Census report, which was of
dubious validity anyway, were too small to warrant stripping
any states of representation.2 80 In a vain attempt to prevent §2
from being effectively nullified, Congress enacted a statute
reiterating its provisions that remains valid law to this day.2 81
Despite this halfhearted compromise, §2 has never been
enforced.282
Congress' attempts to implement §2 shortly after enacting
it yield valuable insight into how its framers understood the
Fourteenth Amendment right to vote. They focused on whether
states imposed additional qualifications for voting, such as
property, color, or education.283 In the words of Senator Howard,
"No matter what may be the ground of exclusion, whether a
want of education, a want of property, a want of color, or a want
of anything else, it is sufficient that the person is excluded from
the category of voters, and the State loses representation in
proportion."2 84 Section 2 was understood as prohibiting states
from disenfranchising groups of people-the poor, the ignorant,
racial minorities-based on their possession of purportedly
279 Id. at 83 (Dec. 12, 1871) (statement of Rep. Garfield).
280 Zuckerman, supra note 90, at 113-14; see, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 2d
Sess. 670 (Jan. 29, 1871) (statement of Sen. Morrill).
281 The law stated:
[S]hould any State, after the passage of this act, deny or abridge the right of
any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and
citizens of the United States, to vote at any election named in the amendments
to the Constitution, article fourteen, section two, except for participation in the
rebellion or other crime, the number of Representatives apportioned in this act
to such State shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male
citizens shall have to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of
age in such State.
Act of Feb. 2, 1872, ch. 11, § 6, 17 Stat. 28, 29. A slightly reworded version of this
provision remains in effect. See 2 U.S.C. § 6.
282 Curtis, supra note 22, at 958.
283 Cf. Curtis, supra note 22, at 957 (pointing out that "literacy tests, educational
tests, property qualifications, tests based on the ability to read and 'understand' the
state constitution, and a host of other methods of denying the right to vote" were
prohibited by § 2).
284 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2767 (May 23, 1866) (statement of Sen.
Howard).
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undesirable traits.285 The 41st Congress's enumeration of all
state laws and constitutional provisions throughout the country
that violated the right to vote completely omitted any reference
to administrative procedures or requirements that people had to
follow or satisfy in order to establish their identity or eligibility
to vote.28 6
Although photo identification requirements did not exist
during the Reconstruction Era-at the time, photography itself
was cumbersome and far less common than today-numerous
other procedural requirements for voting existed that the House
Census Committee did not identify as violating the right to vote.
Alexander Keyssar, in his magisterial history of the right to
vote, explains that, from the early 1800s, states had established
"detailed rules governing the conduct of elections," such as laws
governing "what documents had to be presented as proof of
citizenship"287 and "cumbersome registration procedures."288
Before voter registration laws became common, state laws
regulated the "documentary proofs (or witnesses)" that people
had to bring to polling places with them in order to be permitted
to vote.289 In the years after the Civil War, laws that
"established the procedures that a potential voter had to follow
in order to participate in elections" became of "increasing
significance."290 The omission of any of these types of statutes
from the House Census Committee's report strongly suggests
that the Members of Congress who debated and enacted §2 did
not view such procedural requirements as denying or abridging
the right to vote, even though people were required to satisfy
them in order to be permitted to vote.
The 41st Congress' interpretation of §2 is comparable to
how the Supreme Court has interpreted the Qualifications
Clauses, which specify the age and citizenship requirements a
285 id.
286 See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
287 ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 24 (rev. ed. 2009); see also id. at 111 ("One such
obstacle was to require naturalized citizens to present their naturalization papers to
election officials before registering or voting . . .. [TIhis requirement, as lawmakers
knew, was a significant procedural hurdle for many immigrants. . .
28 Id. at 104.
288 Id. at 122.
290 Id. at 103; see also id. (noting that, after the Civil War, many states "drew up
increasingly detailed statutes that spelled out electoral procedures of all types . ...
[MIany of these laws were straightforwardly administrative.").
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person must satisfy to run for Congress.291 In United States
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,292 the Court held that the clauses
bar states from enacting laws that "render[ ] a class of potential
candidates ineligible for ballot position."29 3 It emphasized that
the Qualifications Clauses do not prohibit states from enacting
laws which "regulate[ ] election procedures," because such
provisions do not "even arguably impose any substantive
qualification rendering a class of potential candidates ineligible
for ballot position" or public office. 2 9 4 Rather, procedural
restrictions and other such requirements "protect[] the integrity
and regularity of the election process, an interest independent of
any attempt to ... impos[e] ... additional qualifications for
service in Congress."295
The Fourteenth Amendment's legislative history
demonstrates that the provision's framers intended and
interpreted the right to vote to prohibit states from establishing
additional qualifications for voting comparable to the types of
requirements the Qualifications Clauses prohibit states from
imposing for congressional candidates. The House Census
Committee-without apparent disagreement from any Members
of Congress-deemed it a violation of the right to vote when
states barred certain categories or classes of people from voting,
such as racial minorities, those who lived on federal land, new
residents, the poor, the illiterate, or the insane.296 There is no
evidence that the right to vote was understood as limiting the
ability of states to regulate the procedure for voting, including
through laws establishing requirements for proving citizenship
or identity.297
IV. SECTION TwO, COMMENTATORS, AND THE COURTS
Both courts and scholars have overlooked remedial
equilibration as a guide for developing a more accurate,
291 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 3.
292 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
293 Id. at 835.
294 id.
295 id.
296 See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
297 Cf. supra notes 284-89 and accompanying text (discussing types of voter
identification and other administrative requirements that existed before and during the
Reconstruction Era).
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objective, and constitutionally based understanding of the scope
of the Fourteenth Amendment right to vote. Professor Franita
Tolson is among the few scholars who have considered §2's
penalties in interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment.298 She
cites §2's remedial provisions as the basis for Congress's
authority to enact laws regulating state and local elections,299
such as the Voting Rights Act.30 0
Tolson begins her argument by pointing out that § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment allows Congress to enact "appropriate"
legislation to enforce the rights conferred in §§ 1 through 4.301 In
City of Boerne v. Flores,302 the Supreme Court held that
Congress may enact a statute under § 5 only if it is a congruent
and proportionate response to violations of those rights that
Congress has evidence are occurring.303 Under Boerne, Congress
may use its § 5 authority to enact laws to protect the right to
vote as long as they are congruent and proportionate responses
to actual voting rights violations.
Tolson recognizes that § 2 imposes the "extreme penalty" of
reduction in representation on states that violate the right to
vote.304 She contends that the severity of that penalty
necessarily makes any "lesser" penalties that Congress may
enact for violations of that right "proportionate," and therefore
permissible, exercises of Congress' §5 authority.305 She explains,
"Lesser penalties, like the preclearance regime imposed on
certain jurisdictions by sections 4(b) and 5 of the VRA, are an
'appropriate' means of protecting the right to vote because such
remedies are less intrusive of state sovereignty than reduced
representation under section 2."306 Thus, in Tolson's view, the
298 Tolson, supra note 24, at 384-85.
299 Id.
300 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 52 U.S.C.).
3o1 U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 5.
302 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
so3 Id. at 519-20; see also Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368
(2001).
304 Tolson, supra note 24, at 384.
3os Id. at 401; see also id. at 384-85 ("[Tjhe extreme penalty in section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment ... influences the scope of penalties that Congress can impose
pursuant to its enforcement authority" under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and § 2
of the Fifteenth Amendment.).
306 Id. at 385; see also id. at 439 ("[Slection 2 represents the proper baseline from
which to assess voting rights legislation enacted pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth
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Voting Rights Act's preclearance and other requirements
are constitutional.3 0 7
While the Voting Rights Act may be constitutionally
defensible on a number of grounds,308 § 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment is not among them. Section 2 does not, and was not
intended to, permit Congress to compel states to expand their
electorates.309 Rather, § 2 was specifically drafted to permit
states to deny the franchise to citizens they deem unqualified to
vote; states that engage in such disenfranchisement suffer
reduced representation in the House as a result. Despite
imposing this severe consequence on states that limit the
franchise, § 2 does not purport to deprive each state of the power
and prerogative to ultimately make that choice for itself. Section
2 therefore cannot serve as constitutional authorization for
statutes that affirmatively compel states to bestow or enforce a
right to vote.
Professors Mark R. Killenbeck and Steve Sheppard also
have argued in favor of a sweepingly broad construction of § 2,
contending that term limits "may be characterized as an
'abridgment' of the right to vote" under that provision.310 They
contend, perhaps somewhat too summarily, that § 2 "seems to
include within its ambit any measure that restricts the ability to
vote for a particular candidate for federal representative."3 1 1
Under § 2, a State that imposes term limits for Members of
Congress would "be required to forfeit some or all of its
representatives in Congress and some or all of its
electoral votes."312
This argument seems to make virtually any ballot access
restriction a violation of the right to vote. Moreover, this
interpretation seems to imply that the Constitution's
Qualifications Clauses, which establish age and citizenship
Amendment.").
307 Id. at 426.
308 Cf. Shelby County Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (invalidating § 4(a) of the
Voting Rights Act, which identifies the "covered jurisdictions" to which § 5's preclearance
requirements apply); N.W. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203-
04 (2009) (questioning the constitutionality of § 5 of the VRA).
300 See supra Part II.
310 Killenbeck & Sheppard, supra note 61, at 1129.
311 Id. at 1208-09.
312 id.
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requirements for Members of Congress,313 also abridge the right
to vote. From a practical perspective, a person's right to vote
cannot meaningfully be deemed abridged because a handful of
potential candidates (such as those subject to term limits) are
barred from running for office. "[N]ot all restrictions imposed by
the States on candidates' eligibility for the ballot impose
constitutionally-suspect burdens on voters' rights to associate or
to choose among candidates."31 4
Professor Gabriel Chin, in contrast, offers an extremely
narrow view of §2, arguing that it is "like the Fifteenth
Amendment, except that it covers fewer people, fewer elections,
and offers more limited remedies."315 Chin explains, "Section 2
recognized state power to disenfranchise African-Americans,
while the Fifteenth Amendment removed that power."316
Moreover, §2's remedy for denials of the right to vote is
reduction in representation, while the Fifteenth Amendment
contemplates direct enforcement of that right.317 Finally, §2
applies only to certain specified elections, while the Fifteenth
Amendment applies to any.3 18 In any case where §2 might be
invoked, Chin maintains, the Fifteenth Amendment, which
"require[s] enfranchisement of African-Americans," can be
applied instead.319 The Fifteenth Amendment therefore
implicitly repeals § 2.320
Tolson demonstrates that, although some Members of
Congress adopted this interpretation of the Fifteenth
Amendment during its ratification debates,321 "very few people
actually believed section 2 was a dead letter upon the adoption
31 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 3.
314 Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983); cf. Timmons v. Twin Cities
Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 363 (1997) (upholding a statute barring candidates from
running for office as the nominee of two or more different political parties, even though it
"reduce[s] the universe of potential candidates who may appear on the ballot as [a]
party's nominee ... by ruling out those few individuals who. .. have already agreed to
be another party's candidate").
315 Chin, supra note 23, at 263.
316 Id. at 275.
117 Id. at 277-78.
s18 Id. at 281. Chin further points out that the Court's adjudication of voting rights
issues under the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of § 1 effectively
crowds out § 2, leaving it nothing to govern. Id. at 291-92.
319 Chin, supra note 23, at 263.
320 Id.




of the Fifteenth Amendment."322 Indeed, many of the Members
of Congress and other contemporaneous commentators that
Chin himself cites stated only that the Fifteenth Amendment
modified § 2, not that it completely repealed § 2.323
Professor Richard M. Re and attorney Christopher Re also
point out that § 2 "applies to all noncriminal disenfranchisement
of adult male citizens in specified elections. Section 2 thus
reaches many facially race-neutral voting rules, such as literacy
tests and poll taxes."3 2 4 The Fifteenth Amendment, in contrast,
is limited solely to disenfranchisement based on race. Moreover,
§ 2 allows for the possibility of legislative action without the
need for judicial involvement.32 5 Thus, Chin's argument that § 2
has been effectively repealed is unpersuasive.
Finally, Professor Michael Kent Curtis contends that courts
should largely abandon an originalist interpretation of § 2 and
construe it to prohibit any "unnecessary obstacles to the right to
vote or those that strike at the caste of economic class."3 26 In
effect, he appears to argue that courts should simply construe § 2
the way that courts currently apply § 1, as prohibiting
unreasonable burdens on the right to vote. This interpretation
would effectively strip § 2 of any independent significance. Like
Curtis, this Article contends that §§ 1 and 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment should be construed harmoniously with each other.
Unlike Curtis, it contends that the remedy expressly set forth in
§ 2 should be considered in determining the scope of the right to
vote under § 1. Only direct disenfranchisement, sufficient to
warrant a reduction in representation, should be deemed a
violation of the right to vote, whether that right is asserted
under the Due Process Clause, Equal Protection Clause, or
§ 2 itself.
For the first several decades following its enactment, federal
courts construed § 2 consistently with its legislative history. In
1873, in United States v. Anthony,327 a federal trial court
rejected Susan B. Anthony's claim that women were
322 Tolson, supra note 24, at 419.
323 Chin, supra note 23, at 272-73.
324 Re & Re, supra note 22, at 1657; see also Bonfield, supra note 74, at 112.
125 Re & Re, supra note 22, at 1657.
326 Curtis, supra note 22, at 1007.
327 24 F. Cas. 829 (N.D.N.Y. 1873).
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constitutionally entitled to vote.3 2 8 It held that §2 expressly
limited that right only to males and that, in any event, states
were free to decide whether to extend the franchise to everyone
who fell within the amendment's scope, or instead suffer a
reduction in representation.329
The following year, in Minor v. Happersett,330 the Supreme
Court held that § 2 implicitly recognized the right of each State
to decide for itself whether to extend the franchise to certain
people (although the Fifteenth Amendment barred States from
denying the right to vote based on race).331 It reaffirmed this
ruling in United States v. Reese332 and United States v.
Cruikshank,333 reiterating that the Constitution does not confer
an affirmative right to vote, but rather only prohibits states
from denying the franchise based on race or color.
In McPherson v. Blacker,334 the Court held that §2 does not
require states to hold elections for the office of presidential
elector.335 It added, however, that if a state chooses to appoint
electors based on the outcome of a popular election, then the
right to vote at that election "cannot be denied or abridged
without invoking [§2's] penalty."3 3 6 It elaborated, "[T]he right to
vote intended to be protected refers to the right to vote as
established by the laws and constitution of the State."337
The Court arguably undermined § 2 over a half-century
later in Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections.338
Lassiter upheld the constitutionality of literacy tests as
prerequisites for voting, as long as they were administered in a
fair, non-discriminatory manner, in order to "raise the standards
for people of all races who cast the ballot."3 39 The Court also
328 See generally id.
329 Id. at 831.
330 88 U.S. 162 (1874).
31 Id. at 174-75 (holding that § 2's remedy of reduction in representation would
have been unnecessary "if it [were] not in the power of the legislature to deny the right of
suffrage to some male inhabitants" or "if suffrage [were] the absolute right of all
citizens").
332 92 U.S. 214, 219-20 (1876).
3 92 U.S. 542, 555-56 (1876).
3 146 U.S. 1 (1982)
335 Id. at 39.
336 id.
337 id.
338 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959).
3 Id. at 53-54.
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reaffirmed that the right to vote was "subject to the imposition
of state standards," so long as the state did not discriminate
based on race.340 Quoting McPherson, the Court declared that,
when § 2 speaks of the right to vote, it is "'the right to vote as
established by the laws and constitution of the State."'341
Interpreting this principle broadly, Lassiter concluded that
states have "wide scope" to limit who may vote through
residency requirements, age restrictions, prohibitions on felon
voting, and literacy tests.342 The Court recognized that literacy
tests could be manipulated to disenfranchise blacks, or be
enacted with discriminatory intent, but there was no evidence
that the literacy test before it was tainted by such concerns.343
The Voting Rights Act, enacted pursuant to Congress' authority
to implement the Fifteenth Amendment,344 ultimately prohibited
literacy tests,3 4 5 and the Court has upheld that portion of the
statute.346 Nevertheless, Lassiter adopted a narrower conception
of the scope of the right to vote under § 2 than its framers had
intended; literacy requirements were among the types of laws
that the House Census Committee had identified as violating § 2
shortly after that provision was ratified.347
Only a few plaintiffs have attempted to bring claims directly
under § 2, and they have been uniformly unsuccessful. Courts
have disposed of §2 lawsuits on a variety of grounds.348 Some
have concluded that §2 challenges are non-justiciable political
questions to be resolved by Congress.349 The D.C. Circuit once
340 Id. at 51.
34 Id. (quoting McPherson, 146 U.S. at 39).
342 Lassiter, 360 U.S. at 51.
a4 Id. at 53.
34 U.S. CONsT. amend. XV, § 2.
345 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4(e), 79 Stat. 437, 439 (codified
as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10303(e)).
346 See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); see also South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 333-34 (1966); United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128,
140-41 (1965).
34 See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
348 Courts have consistently rejected the argument that § 2 prohibits states from
having appointed judges. Holley v. Askew, 583 F.2d 728, 730 (5th Cir. 1978); Parker v.
Maus, No. 11-CV-1777-REB-CBS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137490 (D. Colo. Aug. 16, 2012),
approved and adopted by 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137543 (D. Colo. Sept. 25, 2012),
amended by 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139249 (D. Colo. Sept. 27, 2012); see also African Am.
Voting Rights Legal Def. Fund v. Missouri, 994 F. Supp. 1105, 1120 (E.D. Mo. 1997),
aff'd, 133 F.3d 921 (8th Cir. 1998) (per curiam).
3 Dennis v. United States, 171 F.2d 986, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1948), aff'd, 339 U.S. 162
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relied on its equitable discretion to refrain from adjudicating a
§2 claim for a declaratory judgment.350 It explained that the
Civil Rights Act, 35 1 Voting Rights Act, 35 2 and Twenty-Fourth
Amendment353-all of which, at the time, had only recently
entered into effect-should be given the opportunity
to remediate most of the plaintiffs' concerns
about disenfranchisement.35 4
Many §2 cases are dismissed for lack of standing. Some
plaintiffs sought to have other states' representation in the
House (that is, representation of states in which they did not
reside) reduced on the grounds that those states were denying
the right to vote to certain segments of their populations.355
Courts rejected those claims because the plaintiffs were unable
to show that their own states would receive additional seats in
the House as a result of any such reductions.356 Other plaintiffs
sought to have their own states' representation in Congress
reduced on the grounds that their states were disenfranchising
people in violation of §2.357 They argued that the threat of such
reductions would likely induce their states to expand the
(1950); Saunders v. Wilkins, 152 F.2d 235, 237-38 (4th Cir. 1945) (declining to
determine whether "the number of Representatives from Virginia and therefore of other
states in the Union as set out in the Act of Congress is erroneous and should be
changed"); cf. United States v. Sharrow, 309 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1962) (questioning
whether the political question doctrine continues to bar § 2 suits in light of Baker v.
Carr).
a5o Lampkin II, 360 F.2d 505, 511 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ("[O]ur discretion is best exercised
by declining to compel the District Court to open the door to judicial relief until it can
fairly be said that discrimination persists despite these new measures."); see also
Sharrow v. Brown, 319 F. Supp. 1012, 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (rejecting the plaintiffs § 2
claim because he failed to show that states continued to disfranchise voters following
passage of the Voting Rights Act), aff'd, 447 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1971).
351 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (July 2, 1964).
352 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (Aug. 6, 1965).
. U.S. CONST., amend. XXIV.
3 Lampkin II, 360 F.2d at 511.
355 See, e.g., Lampkin I, 239 F. Supp. 757, 759-60 (D.D.C. 1965), aff'd on other
grounds, Lampkin II, 360 F.2d 505 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
356 Lampkin I, 239 F. Supp. at 760 ("[TIt would be sheer speculation that such data
would result in the acquisition of one or more House seats by . . . the States in which
Group 1 plaintiffs reside."); Sharrow v. Brown, 447 F.2d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 1971) ("[E]ven
after approximate nation-wide reapportionment figures were derived, it might well be
that, because of population shifts, or because New York itself disenfranchised a portion
of its adult males, New York's representation would not be increased as [plaintiff|
claims."); see also Sharrow v. Fish, 501 F. Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 659 F.2d 1062
(2d Cir. 1981); Sharrow v. Peyser, 443 F. Supp. 321, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 582 F.2d
1271 (2d Cir. 1978).
3 See, e.g., Lampkin I, 239 F. Supp. at 759.
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franchise. The courts rejected such claims, as well, on the
grounds that the possibility that a state would remove barriers
to voting in response to a reduction in representation is "both
remote and speculative."358 In suits where plaintiffs sought to
compel the Census Bureau to collect information concerning the
number of people in each state who were impermissibly
disenfranchised, courts have held that the Census Bureau is
neither statutorily nor constitutionally required to collect such
information to allow § 2 to be enforced.359
Thus, this Article's proposal is a departure from other
academics' and courts' approaches to §2. Nevertheless, its
recommendations are based on a straightforward interpretation
of § 2's plain meaning, consistent with both § 2's legislative
history and its framers' understanding of the "right to vote"
enshrined within it, and a commonsense application of
remedial equilibration.
V. CONCLUSION
A substantial amount of election-related litigation concerns
whether certain procedures or requirements for voting, such as
proof-of-citizenship or voter identification laws, violate the
fundamental constitutional "right to vote." In making this
decision, many courts make effectively subjective judgments
about whether the challenged statutes or regulations make
voting too burdensome.360
The Constitution, however, does not leave this
determination solely to judges' untrammeled discretion. Section
2 of the Fourteenth Amendment offers important insight into
the scope of the right to vote by establishing a uniquely severe
penalty-reduction in representation in the House of
Representatives and Electoral College-for states that violate
that right. Remedial deterrence, a component of Levinson's
theory of remedial equilibration, teaches that courts take into
" Id. at 761.
3 Sharrow v. Brown, 447 F.2d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 1971) ("Although the Census Bureau
may be the most efficient instrument for gathering these statistics ... nothing in the
Constitution mandates that the Census Bureau be the agency to gather these
statistics."); United States v. Sharrow, 309 F.3d 77, 79-80 (2d Cir. 1962); Lampkin I, 239
F. Supp. at 763-64.
3 See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 189-90 (2008);
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 & n. 9 (1983).
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account the severity of the remedy for violating a legal provision
when determining that provision's scope. Here, stripping a State
of its seats in the House and votes in the Electoral College is an
especially severe penalty. It effectively nullifies the results of
one or more elections, disenfranchises the people who voted for
the ejected representatives, dilutes the vote of each member of
the state's electorate, and potentially even changes control of
Congress or the outcome of a presidential election. For such a
dramatic penalty to be appropriate, a State's actions would have
to be especially egregious. Courts should employ this remedial
equilibration approach when considering whether various
election laws and regulations violate the Fourteenth
Amendment right to vote.
This remedial deterrence interpretation of §2 is consistent
with the provision's legislative history. Throughout most of the
debates that led to its enactment, §2's supporters candidly
acknowledged that reduction in representation would be the
primary, if not exclusive, means of enforcing the right to vote.
Even if modern courts will enforce the right to vote through
injunctive relief, Congress' repeated focus, throughout the
debates over the Fourteenth Amendment, on reduction in
representation as the remedy for violations of that right
underscores the need to construe its scope in light of that
intended remedy.
Congress's early interpretation of §2 further bolsters a
remedial deterrence interpretation. A House committee report,
generated shortly after §2's ratification, listed every state law
and constitutional provision in effect at the time that was
deemed to violate the right to vote.361 Importantly, there is no
record of any Representative or Senator criticizing the report as
under-inclusive or ignoring certain types of violations. All of the
laws deemed to violate §2 imposed additional qualifications for
voting by disenfranchising entire groups of people, such as the
poor, the ignorant or illiterate, or racial minorities, due to their
purportedly undesirable traits.362 The list did not include any
registration requirements, identification procedures, or other
administrative rules governing the electoral process, despite the
fact that such laws existed throughout the country.363
361 See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
362 id s
36 See supra notes 286-89.
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Thus, the text and structure of § 2, the debates leading to its
enactment, contemporaneous interpretation and application of
that provision, and the persuasive considerations underlying the
theory of remedial deterrence all counsel in favor of construing
the Fourteenth Amendment right to vote as prohibiting the
actual, direct disenfranchisement of disfavored groups of people,
and not administrative procedures for registration or voting.
Facially neutral paperwork or other administrative
requirements that do not directly disenfranchise people are
unlikely to warrant the uniquely severe remedy of stripping a
state of its seats in the House or Electoral College. Even if one
disagrees with this specific conclusion, however, remedial
equilibration still provides a more accurate, objective, and
constitutionally based approach to determining whether
particular laws violate the Fourteenth Amendment right to vote
than purely ad hoc, subjective interest balancing.

